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BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS: 
PATENTABILITY AND MORALITY RELATED 
TO HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS 
 
 LI JIANG* 
 ABSTRACT 
 The patentability of inventions related to Human Embryonic Stem Cells 
(HESC) is challenged by the morality provision of various nations’ 
regulations.
1
 This Article discusses whether it is a matter of expediency to 
prohibit granting patents to HESC-related inventions based on morality-
based provisions, and it concludes that this is not appropriate. To claim 
this, the Article explores typical cases and regulations in the European 
Union, United States, and China. However, different areas adopt various 
approaches in dealing with this extremely complex issue. This comparison 
sheds light on the inappropriate combination of morality and patentability 
in the EU and China. The comparison of these areas also demonstrates 
infusing patent law with morality is both inefficient and ineffective as 
morality is not a criterion that patent authorities should  consider. 
                                                          
* Li Jiang holds a Ph.D. from Bangor University Law School, a LL. M from Shandong 
University, and a B.S. in Biotechnology from University of Science and Technology 
Beijing,  The author would like to thank Dr Shi Wei for his invaluable input, as well as the 
staff of the Intellectual Property Brief for their tremendous work and care, without which 
this publication would not be possible.  
 1.  See Article 53(a) of European Patent Convention (stating that “European patents 
shall not be granted in respect of inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be 
contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality; such exploitation shall not be deemed to be so 
contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the 
Contracting States”); see also Article 5 of Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(stating that patent rights shall not be granted for invention-creations that violate the law or 
social ethics or harm public interests); Article 32 of Korean Patent Law (stating that 
inventions liable to contravene the public order or morality or cause injury to the public 
health shall not be patentable). 
JIANG_ FINAL (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2015  1:25 PM 
54 AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BRIEF Vol. 6:1 
Additionally, in terms of funds invested into research, the reward of a 
patent seems to have been overvalued. This Article argues that it is better 
to establish the specific authority to monitor HESC research instead of 
infusing morality with patentability. A patent system without a moral clause 
would be beneficial to move HESC research forward. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Inventions related to Human Embryonic Stem Cells (HESC) as a 
patentable subject matter are in considerable flux.
2
 In most circumstances, 
                                                          
 2.  See Amanda Odell West, The Absence of Informed Consent to Commercial 
Exploitation for Inventions Developed from Human Biological Material: A Bar to 
Patentability?, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 373, 390 (2009) (arguing that inventions using human 
biological matter should submit “evidence of ethical approval” with its application to the 
EPO); Amanda Warren-Jones, A Mouse in Sheep’s Clothing: The Challenge to the Patent 
Morality Criterion Posed by “Dolly”, 20 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 445, 450 (1998) 
(discussing the obstacles presented to HESC-related inventions under the current European 
patent system); see also Graeme Laurie, Patenting Stem Cells of Human Origin, 26 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 59, 59 (2004) (expressing concern over the “bioethical aspects of the 
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morality and law may not coincide, yet moral obstacles are significant for 
inventions related to HESC research. Patent examiners inevitably encounter 
moral issues when examining applications related to HESC.   The 
connection between law and morality in HESC is natural and “hardly 
new.”
3
  The creation, operation, and interpretation of the patent system  is 
inherently linked to moral standards.
4
  Some consider the marriage of law 
and morality in this area to be in “a hopelessly confused state.”
5
 
Different from the patentability of other inventions, morality plays an 
important role in patenting HESC inventions.  Therefore, we must ask 
whether it is reasonable to reject HESC inventions on moral grounds.  
Every jurisdiction develops its own answer to this question due to the 
diversity of moral standards and the territorial patent system.
6
 On the one 
hand, the patent prohibition of HESC related inventions based on morality 
issues is unreasonable since the supposedly immoral research has already 
been carried out.
7
 This immoral research should neither be funded nor 
initiated instead of being ineligible for patenting because, even if prohibited 
from patenting, the immoral research has already been carried out. Moral 
considerations are deeply rooted in the EU—and this is even true in the 
United Kingdom, which has liberal policies towards HESC research.
8
 In 
the EU, in order to harmonize HESC regulation, regulators have erected a 
                                                          
law”). 
 3.  See Peter Drahos, Biotechnology Patents, Markets and Morality, 21 EUR. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 441, 441 (1999) (pointing out “[s]ome areas of law invite adjudicators to draw 
on morality in the process of legal decision-making. Somewhat surprisingly, given its 
characterization as a tool of economic regulation, patent law does just this . . . The express 
connection between patent law and morality is hardly new”). 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  See Laurie, supra note 2 at 65 (stating that the introduction of HESC technology 
has demonstrated that the system is flawed). 
 6.  For example, the US patent system does not preclude patenting HESC inventions. 
See U.S. Patent, No. 5,843,780 (filed Jan. 18, 1996) (issued Dec. 1, 1998), U.S. Patent No. 
6,200,806 (filed Jun. 26, 1998) (issued Mar. 13, 2001), and U.S. Patent No. 7,029,913 (filed 
Oct. 18, 2001) (issued Apr. 18, 2006). The EU patent system precludes patenting HESC 
inventions; see generally Use of embryos/WARF, G 2/06 [2009] 5 OJ EPO 306. 
 7.  See generally Use of embryos/WARF, G 2/06 [2009] 5 OJ EPO 306 (explaining 
that practicing the invention conflicts with concepts of morality, not the act of patenting the 
invention). 
 8.  See Aurora Plomer, Beyond the HFE Act 1990: The Regulation of Stem Cell 
Research in the UK, 10 MED. L. REV. 132, 132-44 (2002) (stating that “[t]he UK currently 
stands alone in Europe in permitting the creation of human embryos specifically for research 
purposes, including the use of cloning techniques”); see also Dame Mary Warnock DBE, 
The Warnock Report, HUMAN FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITIES (June 26, 
1984), available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/2068.html (discussing two extreme views: one is 
from members of the Catholic Church who believe human embryos have human status, and 
another is from utilitarians who insist human embryos have no moral status). 
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moral barrier to patenting HESC-related inventions.
9
  The moral barrier in 
patent law is ineffective and inefficient. First, although the European Patent 
Convention made a great effort to harmonize the patentability and morality 
of HESC through the EU Biotechnology Directive,
10
 the morality standards 
for patentability  are inconsistently interpreted, specifically by including 
the definitions for morality, human embryo, industrial use, and commercial 
use.
11
  In addition, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European 
Patent Office’s (EPO) dual system of assessing morality standards has 
resulted in legal uncertainty.
12
 Also, member states have different 
interpretations for adapting the moral exclusion of the European Patent 
Convention.
13
  This legal inconsistency has added procedural complexity 
and thus hampered technological advancement.  Second, many HESC 
related research projects are funded by the EU; however, the results of 
these research projects cannot be patented.
14
 Taken to its logical end, 
‘immoral’ research should not receive EU funding in the first place if it 
cannot later be patented for these reasons. If the research could be funded 
by the EU, this research should be morally examined before being 
concluded because funding research projects that are precluded from patent 
protection is a waste of money and time. Therefore, we should reconsider 
how much patent law can accommodate morality issues. 
                                                          
 9.  Article 53(a) of European Patent Convention (“European patents shall not be 
granted in respect of inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to 
‘ordre public’ or morality.”). 
 10.  See Article 53(a) of European Patent Convention; Directive 98/44/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council: Of July 6, 1998 of the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions (arguing for greater legal protections for biotechnological 
inventions). 
 11.  See Laurie, supra note 2 at 59-66 (stating that “despite the fact that disquiet and 
discussions of an ethic nature held up the adoption of the biotechnology Directive for so 
long, it is far from clear that we are any further forward in developing uniform, logical, 
principled, and defensible ethical guidelines within European patent law”). 
 12.  See generally Use of embryos/WARF, G 2/06 [2009] 5 OJ EPO.306. 
 13.  See generally ÅSA HELLSTADIUS, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE’S MORALITY CLAUSE, IN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL 
PATENTS: EUROPEAN PATENT LAW AND ETHICS 96-148 (Aurora Plomer & Paul Torremans 
eds., 1st ed. Oxford University Press) (2009). 
 14.  “Since 2007, the EU had funded twenty-seven collaborative health research 
projects involving the use of human embryonic stem cells with an EU contribution of about 
€157 million. Human embryonic stem cell research projects represent approximately one 
third of health projects on all forms of stem cells. In addition, the European Research 
Council had funded 10 projects for an EU financial contribution of about €19 million and 
there have been twenty-four Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions involving human embryonic 
stem cell research worth €23 million.” European Citizens’ Initiative:  European 
Commission replies to ‘One of Us’ – Q&A, European Commission (May 28, 2014), 
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-385_en.doc. 
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On the other hand, the patent prohibition of HESC-related inventions 
based on morality issues does not seem to be an effective method of 
controlling immoral research. For example, although China’s patent law 
contains a moral exclusion clause, doctors remain uncertain as to the types 
of research they are permitted to conduct due to ambivalence towards 
moral and medicals risks.
15
  This article takes the view that the adoption of 
the moral exclusion clause in patent law by Chinese regulators merely 
reflects the perception that the moral exclusion represents an international 
custom. However, interpretations of the moral exclusion clause in patent 
law are severely lacking. The considerable gap left by the moral provision 
makes it confusing and controversial.  There are reports of many promising 
stem cell therapies, such as stem cell therapy for cardiac repair, Graft-
Versus-Host disease, limb ischemla, liver disease, and neural repair being 
conducted in Chinese hospitals.
16
 However, these therapies are still not 
tested by clinic trial and are unsafe for patients.  In response to pressure 
from stem cell market demands, some scientists from areas with restrictive 
policies, such as the EU, will move to areas that have permissive policies or 
alternatively, some might conduct research in more permissive regions, 
such as China. Thus, HESC research involving cloning and other sensitive 
procedures will become more difficult to monitor, resulting in biomedical 




This article then discusses whether HESC research can be monitored in 
circumstances when morality issues are not the barriers to patenting.  After 
exploring the U.S.’s HESC-related regulations, the author believes that it is 
technically manageable and pragmatically meaningful to supervise HESC 
research without moral exclusion in patent law.  For example, there is no 
moral exclusion in US patent regulation.
18
  The U.S. government takes a 
rather practical approach of patenting in order to remain competitive in the 
HESC market.
19
  HESC-related inventions are not prohibited from 
                                                          
 15.  Ole Döring, China’s Struggle for Practical Regulations in Medical Ethics, 4 
NATURE REV. GENETICS 233-39 (2003). 
 16.  See Lianming Liao and Robert Chunhua Zhao, An Overview of Stem-Cell Based 
Clinical Trials in China, 17 STEM CELLS AND DEV. 613, 613-618 (2008) (discussing China’s 
progressive “therapeutic application” of stem cell technologies). 
 17.  Ole Doring, Chinese Researchers Promote Biomedical Regulations: What are the 
Motives of the Biopolitical Dawn in China and Where are they Heading?, 14 KENNEDY 
INST. ETHICS J. 39, 42 (2004) (commenting that “the positivistic principle ‘if an action is not 
illegal, by definition, it is legal’ does not apply in China. Taking advantage of the fact that 
policymaking lags behind scientific and economic development, in terms of the entire legal 
and social infrastructure, amounts to biomedical adventurism”). 
 18.  35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103. 
 19.  See generally Comment, Gabriel S. Gross, Federally Funding Human Embryonic 
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patenting for moral reasons.
20
  Federal funding is only used for morally 
acceptable HESC research, which provides an important tool for 
monitoring HESC research.
21
  Although this hands-off approach is market 
orientated,
22
 opponents have strongly criticized this approach for its lack of 
ethical and social considerations.
23
  This article argues that funding control 
is a better way to monitor HESC research.  From an economic perspective, 
deciding to prohibit immoral research at the initial stage saves both time 
and money. 
The above comparison of the U.S., EU, and China demonstrates that 
integrating morality into patent law is both inefficient and ineffective.  
Morality is not a criterion that patent authorities should be tasked with 
assessing.  Even if the results of HESC research cannot be patented, it 
could still be performed and funded.  However, immoral research should be 
prohibited from the outset instead of at the patent application stage. 
Moreover, from an economic point of view, restricting immoral research 
from the beginning could save a tremendous amount of time and money.  
Additionally, in terms of funds invested into research, the reward of a 
patent seems to have been overvalued.  A patent system without a moral 
clause would be more beneficial for advancing HESC research.  The EU 
and Chinese Patent Offices should not be responsible for examining the 
morality of HESC inventions; instead, these decisions should be left to 
separate special organization, such as the Ethics Committee. Therefore, this 
Article argues that it would be more economically viable to implement 
specific legal regulations applicable to HESC research than to include a 
general moral exclusion in the patent law. 
This Article presents moral concerns surrounding HESC patenting in 
three parts.  Part I explores the incongruous interpretations of moral 
standards and “industrial or commercial use” in EU case law.  The 
inconsistent interpretation of moral provisions has resulted in controversy 
and confusion in the patentability of HESC-related inventions, which 
would certainly become a barrier to technological progress.  Part II 
                                                          
Stem Cell Research: An Administrative Analysis, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 855, 858, 883 (2000) 
(using the “Chevron Two-Step” to analyze the Department of Health and Human Services’ 
interpretation of federal law governing stem cell research funding). 
 20.  §§ 101-103. 
 21.  See Gross, supra note 19. 
 22.  National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell 
Research, Volume 1 Report and Recommendations of the National Advisory Commission 
(Sept. 13, 1999), available at  https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/nbac/stemcell.pdf.  
 23.  See Michael J. Malinowsk & Nick Littlefield, Transformation of a Research 
Platform Into Commercial Products: The Impact of US Federal Policy on Biotechnology, 
THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF GENETIC RESEARCH: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES 80, 
80 (Timothy A. Caulfield & Bryn Williams-Jones eds., 1st ed. 1999). 
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examines the effect of moral provisions in the Chinese patent system. The 
vast interpretive scope left by China’s moral provision makes this provision 
confusing and controversial.  The uncertain interpretation regarding 
morality and patentability of HESC-related invention results in poor 
supervision of HESC research. Part III discusses the developing policies of 
HESC research in the U.S.  Instead of moral exclusion in patentability, the 
U.S. regulates and controls federal funding.   The federal funding control of 
HESC research may provide an alternative approach to patent control. 
Moreover, the inconsistent policies adopted by different administrations 
leave the patentability of HESC-related inventions vulnerable to market 
demands. Through a detailed, section-by-section comparison of each 
approach adopted in these three areas, this Article demonstrates that moral 
exclusion is unnecessary in patent law. 
I. THE EUROPEAN UNION: INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATIONS OF MORAL 
PROVISIONS IN PATENT LAW 
The EU regulation of HESC research related to moral concerns infuses 
patent examination with a moral assessment.
24
  Despite many scholars’ and 
legal practitioners’ belief that patent law is not the proper vehicle for 
enforcing morality and that patent examiners are not moral experts,
25
 the 
EU patent-granting agencies are responsible for interpreting moral 
provisions.
26
  European Biotechnology Directive 98/44/EC explicitly states 
that inventions that involve the “use[] of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purpose” cannot be patented.
27
  However, the question 
                                                          
 24.  See Article 53(a) of European Patent Convention (stating “European patents shall 
not be granted in respect of (a) inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be 
contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality”).  
 25.  See Leland Stanford/MODIFIED ANIMALS, 2002 EPOR 2, at point 51 (stating the 
Opposition Division of European Patent Office has noticed this difference and commented 
that “it cannot be the role of the EPO to act as a moral censor and invoke the provisions of 
Article 53(a) EPC to refuse on ethical grounds to grant a patent on legal research and 
directed to an invention indisputably associated with medical benefits”); see William 
Cornish, David Llewelyn, &Tanya Aplin, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, 
TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 881 (7th ed. 2010) (pointing out that morality and patent 
law should be divided because patent system is not an appropriated arena for moral 
discussion); see also Julia Black, Regulation as Facilitation: Negotiating the Genetic 
Revolution, 61 MOD. L. REV. 621, 649 (1998) (stating that the objective, technical and legal 
nature of patent law is contrary to the morality that is inherently “malleable, subjective and 
emotive”). 
 26.  See Relaxin/Howard Florey Institute, T 0272/95 [2002] EPOR; see also Plant 
Genetic Systems/Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors, T356/93 [1995] EPOR 361; 
HARVARD/Onco-mouse, T19/90, [1990]. 
 27.  Directive 98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 
on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, art. 42, 1998 O.J. (L 213).  
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remains: how should the law assess morality along with the scope of the 
industrial or commercial use referenced in the Directive? 
A. How to assess the morality? 
At the EU level, the European Patent Convention contains a morality 
clause that excludes patenting immoral inventions,
28
 whereas the morality 
standard developed in case law has established inconsistent standards (i.e., 
“abhorrence” versus “unacceptability”). 
1. Howard Florey/Relaxin: the “abhorrence” standard with rebuttable 
presumption approach 
The “abhorrence” standard is drawn from Howard Florey/Relaxin,
29
 
which considers a patent application related to the DNA sequence coding 
for relaxin—the unexpected second form of the human hormone that helps 
relax the uterus during childbirth and reduce the need for Cesarean 
sections.
30
  The patent was initially granted in 1991, but the Green Party 
opposed it in the European Parliament.  One of the Green Party’s primary 
objections was that the issuance of the patent was contrary to morality.
31
   
The Opposition Division of the Patent Office first cited the “abhorrence” 
standard established in the Plant Genetic Systems case.
32
  The Opposition 
Division then established a “rebuttable presumption”
33
 approach to the 
“abhorrence” standard.
34
  Based on this standard, the Relaxin patent did not 
                                                          
 28.  Article 53(a) of European Patent Convention (stating that “[e]uropean patents shall 
not be granted in respect of . . . inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be 
contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality”).  
 29.  Relaxin, 1995 OJ EPO 388 (Opposition Div. 1994) (holding that the the test for the 
abhorrence standard is whether it is probable that the general public would find the 
invention so abhorrent that granting patent rights would be inconceivable.). 
 30.  See F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTENTRICS 41 (Dwight Rouse et al, 
eds., 22d ed. 2005) (explaining the role of relaxin to “promote uterine vascular vasodilation 
and myometrial smooth muscle relaxation); see generally R. Stephen Crespi, The Human 
Embryo and Patent Law—A Major Challenge Ahead?, 28 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 569 
(2006) (discussing the effect of developing biotechnologies on the patent laws in 
industrialized countries).  
 31.  Case T-0272/95, Relaxin/Howard Florey Institute, [2002] EPOR (summarizing that 
the Green Party opposed the European patent 112.149 that was granted to the Howard 
Florey Institute of Experimental Physiology and Medicine for human H-2 relaxin, a 
hormone involved in reproduction, and a DNA sequence coding for the hormone).  
 32.  Case T-356/93, Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems, [1995] EPOR (“It would 
undoubtedly be against ‘ordre public’ or morality to propose a misuse or destructive use of 
these [genetic engineering] techniques.”). 
 33.  See Yan Min, Morality —An Equivocal Area in the Patent System, 34 EUR. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 261, 263 (2012). 
 34.  See Relaxin, 1995 OJ EPO 388 (holding that “[a] fair test to apply is to consider 
JIANG_ FINAL (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2015  1:25 PM 
62 AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BRIEF Vol. 6:1 
go against “widely-accepted moral standards of behavior”, therefore, the 
Green Party’s morality objection is invalid.
35
 
This decision applies the general principle of narrowly interpreting the 
exclusion of patentability.
36
  When the opponent requested to conduct a 
public survey of “what would be patentable,” the Opposition Division 
refused to issue it and indicated that the EPO is not the proper organization 
to determine fundamental moral questions.
37
   Therefore, to some extent, 
the “abhorrence” standard is much lower than the “unacceptability” 
standard discussed below. 
2. Harvard/Onco-mouse: The “unacceptability” standard 
The “unacceptability” standard is mainly implied in the “Onco-mouse” 
case, which involves the patentability of genetically modified mice that are 
useful in cancer research.
38
  In 1992, the Examining Division granted the 
Onco-mouse patent,
39
 which was then challenged on the ground that the 
invention violated the morality requirement of Article 53(a) of the 
European Patent Convention (EPC).
40
  The Technical Appeal Board (TBA) 
cited the “unacceptability” definition in Plant Genetic Systems v. 
Greenpeace as the possible reason for unpatentability.
41
  The TBA 
therefore developed the “unacceptability” standard, which  balances the 
“acceptable suffering” and “unacceptable suffering.”
42
  The analysis from 
this balancing test in this case weighed in favor of patentability due to the 
invention’s massive benefits. 
                                                          
whether it is probable that the public in general would regard the invention as so abhorrent 
that the grant of patent rights would be inconceivable. If it is clear that this is the case, 
objection should be raised under Article 53(a); otherwise not”). 
 35.  See Yan Min, supra note 33 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36.  For a rationale of the Directive, see Crespi, supra note 30, at 571. 
 37.  See R. v. Leland Stanford/MODIFIED ANIMALS, [2002] EPOR 2 (Opposition Div. 
2001). at point 51 (stating the Opposition Division of European Patent Office has 
commented that “it cannot be the role of the EPO to act as a moral censor and invoke the 
provisions of Article 53(a) EPC to refuse on ethical grounds to grant a patent on legal 
research and directed to an invention indisputably associated with medical benefits”). 
 38.  Case T-19/90, Onco-mouse/HARVARD (EPO 1990).  
 39.  Eur. Patent No. 0 169 672 A1 (filed June 24, 1985) (detailing the method for 
producing transgenic animals). 
 40.  See Article 53(a). 
 41.  See Case T-356/93, Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems, [1995] EPOR 16 (stating 
that “the concept of morality is related to the belief that some behavior is right and 
acceptable, whereas other behavior is wrong, and this belief is founded on the totality of the 
accepted norms that are deeply rooted in a particular culture”). 
 42.  Case T-315/03, Transgenic animal/Harvard, [2005] EPOR 2, 8, 17 (explaining 
how the TBA weighs the suffering of animals and possible risks to the environment and the 
invention’s usefulness to mankind). 
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The EPO has therefore developed two moral standards: a balancing test 
to determine whether the “unacceptability” standard applies as well as a 
rebuttable presumption that the “abhorrence” standard applies.  The 
“abhorrence” standard provides minimum morality-based protections.
43
  
The “unacceptability” standard is frequently implicated in patent 
applications related to life.
44
  The EPO can adopt different moral standards 
during the initial examination and the appeal stages of a human 
biotechnology patent application.
45
  The two above-mentioned 
methodologies are fundamentally different:  “the ‘balancing exercise’ 
incorporate[s] diverse issues in direct competition to each other;” 
conversely, “the ‘rebuttable presumption’ [examines] a raft of issues to 
determine if any one of them [constitutes] an ‘abhorrence.’”
46
  The 
distinction between these two standards is significant because “under the 
‘balancing exercise’ all of the issues considered form part of the reason 
why the invention is patentable or not:  whereas the ‘rebuttable 
presumption’ approach identifies a single issue upon which the decision 
rests.”
47
  In the foreseeable future, the equivocal interpretations of the 





3. Plant Genetic Systems v. Greenpeace:  The conflict between 
“abhorrence” standard and “unacceptability” standard 
Both the “abhorrence” and “unacceptability” standards are discussed and 
                                                          
 43.  See Margo A. Bagley, A Global Controversy: The Role of Morality in 
Biotechnology Patent Law, 57 U. VA. L. SCH. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER 
SERIES 332, 333, 335 (2007) (commenting that this “unacceptability” standard is certainly a 
lower hurdle for an invention to overcome than the balancing test); see also Min, supra note 
33 at 264. 
 44.  See Min, supra note 33 at 264 (explaining how this standard most likely applies to 
animal and plant biotechnology).  
 45.  Amanda Warren-Jones, Finding a “Common Morality Codex” For Biotech—A 
Question of Substance, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 638, 652-53 (2008). 
 46.  Id. at 653. 
 47.  Id. (observing that the difference between the two standards can be the difference 
between the patentee being able to resolve the problem by amending the claim or having to 
consign the invention to ignominy). 
 48.  See Min, supra note 33 at 265 (commenting that “[t]his is because, on one hand, 
the so-called morality exception is favoured by the Greens, animal welfare activists and 
environmentalists as a powerful weapon against biotechnology inventions, and consequently 
they prefer a stricter moral standard which is in stark contrast to the proponents of genetic 
engineering who prefer a loose standard; and on the other hand, in contemporary society 
there are few, if any, inventions so obviously immoral as to raise little difficulty in denying 
a grant of patent on the ground of morality”). 
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applied in Plant Genetic Systems.  This case involved the application for a 
patent in glutamine synthetase inhibitors that help plants and seeds resist 
weeds and fungal diseases.
49
  The granted patent was challenged by 
Greenpeace, which argued that it created serious environmental risks.
50
 
The Opposition Division initially refused to exercise the balancing test 
established in the Onco-mouse case by claiming that the “unacceptability” 
standard is not the only way to assess patentability.
51
  Because the moral 
provision acts as an emergency safeguard, the Opposition Division further 
stated that patents should not be granted for inventions that are universally 
regarded as outrageous.
52
  The reason that the Opposition Division adopted 
the “abhorrence” standard instead of the “unacceptability” balancing test 
was that “balancing does not even come into play unless concrete societal 
disadvantages of the invention are presented.”
53
  Therefore, the Opposition 
Division held that only “in those very limited cases in which there is an 
overwhelming consensus that the exploitation of an invention would be 




By contrast, the TBA seems to apply the “unacceptability” rather than 
the “abhorrence” standard.  Based on the interpretation of morality by the 
TBA,
55
 an assessment of morality cannot possibly be achieved by 
balancing benefits and disadvantages because there is no sufficient 
evidence of true benefits or disadvantages.
56
  However, the possibility 
                                                          
 49.  Case T-356/93, Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems, [1995] EPOR 24. 
 50.  Id. at 8 (explaining that “[t]he exploitation of the present invention resulted in 
serious, irreversible environmental risks: the treated plants themselves could become weeds; 
Herbicide-resistance could spread to other plants; [and] the ecosystems could be damaged”).  
 51.  Id. at 12 (disclosing that the Opposition Division found that the “invention did not 
belong to the category of inventions which the public in general would have regarded as 
being so abhorrent or so dangerous that the grant of patent rights should have been 
inconceivable. The EPO should apply the exclusions from patentability under Article 53(a) 
EPC only in such extreme cases”). 
 52.  See id.; see also Amanda Warren-Jones, Vital Parameters for Patent Morality—A 
Question of Form, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 832, 837 n.31 (2007). 
 53.  See Bagley, supra note 43 at 333. 
 54.  See Warren-Jones, supra note 45 at 642. 
 55.  See Case T-356/93, Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems, [1995] EPOR  (TBA) at 16 
(explaining that due to the nature of the EPC, the TBA historically explained “the concept of 
morality is related to the belief that some behavior is right and acceptable whereas other 
behaviour is wrong, this belief being founded on the totality of the accepted norms that are 
deeply rooted in a particular culture”). 
 56.  Id. at 18 (“In the present case, since no sufficient evidence of actual disadvantages 
has been adduced, the assessment of patentability with regard to Article 53(a) EPC may not 
be based on the so-called ‘balancing exercise’ of benefits and disadvantages, as submitted 
by the Appellants. The Board observes that such a ‘balancing exercise’ is not the only way 
JIANG_ FINAL (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2015  1:25 PM 
2015 BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS 65 
remains that a morality assessment could involve assessing potential 
benefits and disadvantages.  Different from the Onco-mouse case where the 
environmental risk is an appropriate consideration for unacceptable patent, 
in Plant Genetic Systems, the Board found “the possibility of risks 
traditionally has no bearing on whether a patent is granted or not.”
57
 
The above analysis shows that the EPO conducts moral assessments 
inconsistently, leading to a cycle of misapplication.  Even in the EPO’s 
decisions, two competing standards, “abhorrence” and “unacceptability,” 
may be applied.  Moreover, this dual system provides no clear guidance on 
which approach is appropriate in any particular case.
58
  This confusion is 
well demonstrated in Plant Genetic Systems because it would apply the 
“rebuttable presumption” approach to the “abhorrence” standard.  The only 
remaining issue would be “how this standard and methodology are to 
operate in practice [which would] require[] an analysis of the evidence 
[that] forms the basis of the decision.”
59
  Amanda Warren-Jones, a legal 
scholar from University of Sheffield, advances three arguments to favor the 
abhorrence approach.
60
  While alternatively, it may be improper to balance 




B. Whether HESC-related inventions should be included in “human 
embryo?” What is the scope of “industrial or commercial use?” 
Another enduring ambiguous aspect of morality is commercial 
exploitation.  The scope of the “industrial or commercial use” in Article 
53(a) of the EPC determines the arena for the moral assessment.  In patent 
examination, morality is capable of being determined only if commercial 
                                                          
of assessing patentability with regard to Article 53(a) EPC, but just one possible way, 
perhaps useful in situations in which an actual damage and/or disadvantage (e.g. suffering of 
animals as in the case of decision T 19/90) exists.”). 
 57.  Id. at 31. 
 58.  Warren-Jones, supra note 45, at 654 (analyzing this issue and arguing that “only 
one defensible approach . . . offers cohesion in the European patent system”). 
 59.  Id.  
 60.  Id. at 653 (arguing that first, unlike the “unacceptability” standard that covers all 
issues related to whether a patent should be granted, the “abhorrence” standard focuses on a 
single issue on which to base a decision. Second, “it is not possible to weigh competing 
issues to determine ‘abhorrence’ because [that concept] is an absolute that does not permit 
fine [logical distinctions] in the way that ‘unacceptability’ does.” Third, the EPO has 
already identified cases involving “abhorrent” inventions. Only when such examinations are 
appealed based on that issue might a decision be reversed). 
 61.  Id. at 654-61 (noting that “[t]he President in the WARF case pointed out that 
adoption of a ‘balancing exercise’ at the initial examination stage imposes an ethical 
assessment beyond the ability and mandate of patent offices”). 
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exploitation has been assured.
62
 
1. University of Edinburgh:  A broad approach by the Opposition Division 
on the interpretation of “human embryos” 
The scope of the exclusion of the “use of human embryos for industrial 
or commercial use” was first addressed in University of Edinburgh/Stem 
Cell Isolation.
63
 That case involved a European patent held by the 
University of Edinburgh’s Austin Smith and Peter Mountford and 
addressed methods of selecting for animal stem cells (including HESC).
64
  
To further complicate matters, a term used in the patent claim referred to 
animals, but did not exclude humans.
65
  Accordingly, fourteen parties 
opposed the patent, including those of Germany and the Netherlands, 
because it might cover HESC, not just animal stem cells.  Those parties 
filed in the Opposition Division
66
 on the ground that granting the patent 
would violate Article 53(a) of the EPC.
67
 
The Opposition Division distinguished between fact and opinion and 
finally concluded that, based on the Biotechnology Directive, HESC-
related inventions derived from destruction of human embryos are not 
patentable.
68
  First, the Opposition Division acknowledged two opposing 
views concerning the scope of the term “human embryo,” as used in Article 
53(a) of the EPC:  the narrow interpretation was understood to mean 
“human embryos” and the broad interpretation was understood to mean 
“human embryos together with the cells retrieved from the destruction of 
those embryos—namely, human ES cells.”
69
  Next, the Opposition Division 
noted that Article 53(a) of the EPC is equivalent to Article 6(2) of the 
                                                          
 62.  Warren-Jones, supra note 2, at 447 (observing that “[e]xamination at the patenting 
stage requires that morality be determined before exploitation has become assured[, and 
that] it is [therefore] inevitable that any assessment at such an early stage in the invention’s 
commercial development will entail some considerations which will consequentially prove 
superfluous”). 
 63.  Case T-1079/03, University of Edinburgh/Stem Cell Isolation (Edinburgh), EP 
949131742 unreported, July 21, 2003, Opposition Division. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Directive 98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 
on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, art. [1998] 42 OJ EPO (L 213) 
(stating within the preamble of the Council Directive that European patents should not be 
granted for inventions involving “uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial 
purposes”). 
 68.  University of Edinburgh/Stem Cell Isolation (Edinburgh), T-1079/03 EP 
949131742 unreported, July 21, 2003, Opposition Division. 
 69.  Crespi, supra note 30, at 572.  
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Directive.
70
  The interpretation of the Directive towards the morality of 
HESC-related inventions, as set forth in its recitals, is that HESC fall 
within the scope of the term “human embryo.”
71
  Thus, the Opposition 
Division held that the broad interpretation was appropriate. 
With regard to the term “industrial or commercial use,” the Opposition 
Division stressed that “use” of HESC-related invention should be 
considered patenting in the event that such invention is morally 
acceptable.
72
  In University of Edinburgh/Stem Cell Isolation, the 
application refers to using HESC which were obtained by destroying 
human embryos; since using HESCs was ethically unacceptable, it is 
unnecessary to consider patenting the “use” of such invention.   Under the 
Opposition Division’s ruling, it is also immoral to use spare embryos from 
in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) procedures and embryos created for research 
since both involve the destruction of human embryos.
73
 
However, a former board of Appeal Member at the EPO, Claudio 
Germinario, expressed a different opinion; specifically, that to conform to a 
previous TBA ruling, the term “human embryo” in Article 6(2) of the 
Directive should be interpreted narrowly.
74
  He pointed out that “the scope 
                                                          
 70.  Council Directive 98/44/EC, art. 6, 1998 O.J. (L 213) (EC). The directive provides:  
“Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be 
contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality; however, exploitation shall not be deemed to be so 
contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation . . . . On the basis of paragraph 
one, the following, in particular, shall be considered unpatentable: (a) processes for cloning 
human beings; (b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings; 
(c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; and (d) processes for 
modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering without 
any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from such 
processes.”  Compare id. with Article 53(a) European Patent Convention; see University of 
Edinburgh/Stem Cell Isolation (Edinburgh), T-1079/03 EP 949131742 unreported, July 21, 
2003, Opposition Division, at 22. 
 71.  Recital 16 of the Directive provides that “it is important to assert the principle that 
the human body, at any stage in its formation or development, including germ cells, and the 
simple discovery of one of its elements or one of its products, including the sequence or 
partial sequence of a human gene, cannot be patented.” Council Directive 98/44/EC, ¶ 16, 
1998 O.J. (L 213) (EC). 
 72.  University of Edinburgh/Stem Cell Isolation (Edinburgh), T-1079/03 EP 
949131742 unreported, July 21, 2003, Opposition Division (stating that if the patenting of a 
product is ethically unacceptable, it is hardly conceivable that the patenting of “uses” of this 
product could be judged differently). 
 73.   Id. 
 74.  Claudio Germinario, The Value of Life, 163 PATENT WORLD 16, 18 (2004) (arguing 
that the function of the patent claims in defining the scope of protection provides a practical 
workable solution to these issues. Thus insofar as the actual claims themselves do no 
encompass any reference to the embryo or preceding step in which the embryo is actually 
used). 
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of the protection conferred by a patent is given by the wording of the 
claims interpreted.”
75
  He believed that since the destruction process was 
not claimed, patenting HESCs was not not a violation even though these 
cells were derived from human embryo.
76
  He further stated that if HESCs 
are “available through importation or from many other sources,” the patent 
application does not necessarily include “the prohibited stage of producing 
the first generation of freshly disaggregated embryonic cells.”
77
 Therefore, 




2. Use of embryos/WARF (G2/06):  The landmark ruling by the European 
Patent Office (EPO) patenting HESC 
WARF addressed the same questions as University of Edinburgh.
79
  This 
case involved a European patent application by the Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation (WARF) titled “Primate embryonic stem cells,” 
covering the derivation and cultures of pluripotent embryonic stem cell 
lines.
80
 The patent description shows that WARF’s claims address 
inventions obtained through a method that involves destroying human 
embryos.
81
  Although the application does not directly claim that method, 
human embryos are inevitably destroyed because the method is the only 
way to obtain the invention.
82
  In 2004, the EPO’s Examining Division 
denied the application.
83
  The examiners held that the claims violated 
Article 53(a), in conjunction with Rule 28(c) of EPC 2000,
84
 because “as 
                                                          
 75.   Id. 
 76.   Id. (stating that although admittedly any such process must begin with the 
destruction of a human embryo this would appear to be immaterial to the patenting of the 
process and cell lines thus obtained in so far as the prohibited step is not claimed.). 
 77.   Id. 
 78.  Id. (applying his analysis to the University of Edinburgh case).  
 79.  See generally Use of embryos/WARF, G 2/06 [2009] 5 OJ EPO 306. 
 80.  Eur. Pat. App. No. 96,903,521 published as EP0770125 (claiming that a cell 
culture comprising primate embryonic stem cells that “(i) are capable of proliferation in an 
in vitro culture for over one year, (ii) maintain a karyotype in which all chromosomes 
normally characteristic of the primate species are present and are not noticeably altered by 
the culturing, (iii) maintain the potential throughout the culture to differentiate into 
derivatives of endoderm, mesoderm, and ectoderm tissues, and (iv) are prevented from 
differentiating when cultured on a fibroblast feeder layer.”). 
 81.  Use of embryos/WARF, G 2/06, [2009] 5 OJ EPO, at 308 (EPO Enlarged Broad of 
Appeal 2009). 
 82.   Id. 
 83.  Id. at 309. 
 84.  See id.; see also Implementing Regulations, European Patent Convention, Nov. 29, 
2000, Rule 28(c) (providing that “[u]nder Article 53(a), European patents shall not be 
granted in respect of biotechnological Inventions which, in particular, concern the 
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regards the generation of human embryonic stem cell cultures, the use of 
human embryos as starting material was described in the application as 
originally filed as being indispensable.”
85
  Although the patent application 
did not directly claim human embryos, the invention is related to them and 
exclusively relies on them.
86
  The examiners also concluded that the use of 
human embryos as a starting material is a use for industrial purposes within 




The decision was appealed and turned over to the Board of Appeals in 
2004.
88
  However, the Board did not rectify the decision and referred four 
questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA).
89
  The first question is 
procedural and concerns the effective time of Rule 28(c).
90
  Regardless of 
the answer to that question, the requirements of Article 53(a) should be met 
beyond Rule 28(c).
91
  The second and third questions referred to the main 
issue in the case:  the patentability of inventions involving the destruction 
of human embryos.  The core argument in the case related to the proper 
approach for interpreting the phrase “use human embryos for industrial or 
commercial use.”
92
  The fourth question related to whether the decision in 
this case was binding when the method for which the patent was sought 
was capable of being accomplished without destroying human embryos as 
of the filing date.
93
 
In 2008, the EBA answered the four questions and decided that no patent 
                                                          
following: . . . c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes”). 
 85.  Use of embryos/WARF, 5 OJ  EPO at 309. 
 86.  Eur. Pat. App. No. 96,903,521 published as EP0770125. 
 87.  Use of embryos/WARF, 5 OJ EPO at 327-28. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 307-08 (stating that four questions are: “(1) Does Rule 28(c) EPC extend to 
patent applications whose claimed subject-matter comprises a product derived from human 
embryos? (2) If the answer to question 1 is yes, does Rule 23d(c) [now 28(c)] EPC forbid 
the patenting of claims directed to products (here: human embryonic stem cell cultures) 
which – as described in the application - at the filing date could be prepared exclusively by a 
method which necessarily involved the destruction of the human embryos from which the 
said products are derived, if the said method is not part of the claims? (3) If the answer to 
question 1 or 2 is no, does Article 53(a) EPC forbid patenting such claims? (4) In the 
context of questions 2 and 3, is it of relevance that after the filing date the same products 
could be obtained without having to recur to a method necessarily involving the destruction 
of human embryos (here: e.g. derivation from available human embryonic cell lines)?”). 
 90.  Use of embryos/WARF, G 2/06 [2009] 5 OJ EPO 306. 
 91.  Id. at 321-22 (noting that Rule 23d(c) contains the same wording as Article 53(a) 
EPC, which took effect in 1973).  
 92.  Ewan Nettleton, EPO’s Enlarged Board Rules on Patenting Stem Cell Inventions, 4 
J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 306, 307 (2009). 
 93.  Use of embryos/WARF, G2/06 [2009] 5 OJ EPO 306. 
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would be granted on inventions related to the destruction of human 
embryos.
94
  First, the EBA affirmed that Rule 28(c) is retroactive to patent 
applications prior to enforcement.
95
  Second, the EBA stated that the 
rationale underlying Rule 28(c) is “the prohibition of the misuse or 
commodification of embryos.”
96
  The exclusion of Rule 28(c) listed in 
Recital 42 of the Directive applies only when human embryos are used for 
a “therapeutic or diagnostic purpose.”
97
  The EBA further held that 
legislators deliberately declined to provide either a precise definition or a 
restricted interpretation of the term “embryo.”
98
  With respect to the 
appellant’s allegation that the claim does not cover human embryo 
destruction, the EBA identified the term used in Rule 28(c) as an 
“invention,” not a “claim.”
99
  The HESC derivation method disclosed in the 
description involved the destruction of the embryo.
100
  Since the destruction 
of the embryo is an “essential and integral” part of the invention, the use of 
the human embryos is for “industrial or commercial exploitation.”
101
  The 
appellant attempted to defend its destruction of human embryos as not for 
“industrial or commercial use.”
102
  However, the EBA disagreed and noted 
that human embryo destruction is one step of the manufacturing procedure 
described in the claim.
103
  Creating an invention that inevitably destroys 
                                                          
 94.   Id. 
 95.  Use of embryos/WARF, G 2/06 5 OJ EPO at 322. 
 96.  Id. at 323-24. 
 97.  Council Directive No. 98/44/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 213) 13, 16 (providing that 
“whereas, moreover, uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes must 
also be excluded from patentability; whereas in any case such exclusion does not affect 
inventions for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes that are applied to the human embryo and 
are useful to it”). 
 98.  Use of embryos/WARF, 5 OJ EPO at 325. 
 99.  Id. at 326 (stating that “this Rule (as well as the corresponding provision of the 
Directive) does not mention claims, but refers to “invention” in the context of its 
exploitation. What needs to be looked at is not just the explicit wording of the claims but the 
technical teaching of the application as a whole as to how the invention is to be performed. 
Before human embryonic stem cell cultures can be used they have to be made. Since in the 
case referred to the Enlarged Board the only teaching of how to perform the invention to 
make human embryonic stem cell cultures is the use (involving their destruction) of human 
embryos, this invention falls under the prohibition of Rule 28(c)”). 
 100.  Id. at 327 (finding that the destruction of the human embryo under the derivation 
method is an integral and essential part of the industrial or commercial exploitation of the 
claimed invention and thus violates the prohibition of Rule 28(c)). 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id.  
 103.  Id. at 329 (“[I]t is important to point out that it is not the fact of the patenting itself 
that is considered to be against the ordre public or morality, but it is the performing of the 
invention, which includes a step (the use involving its destruction of a human embryo) that 
has to be considered to contravene those concepts.”); see Council Directive No. 98/44/EC, 
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human embryos is one type of commercial exploitation.  The patentability 
criterions apply to all steps of inventions.  Since the invention covered the 
step that involved the destruction of human embryo, the patent application 
was rejected for its violation of the morality provisions.
104
  Third, the EBA 
indicated its decision had no influence over the patentability of general 
inventions relating to human stem cells or human stem-cell cultures.
105
 
This case represents a rare instance in which an appellant requested the 
European Patent Convention (EPO) refer a patent question to the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) for the reason that Rule 28(c) is the same as Article 
6(2)(c) of the Directive.
106
 It is rare  because “the Boards of Appeal of the 
EPO are not courts or tribunals of a member state of the EU, and there is no 
power under the EPC for a Board of Appeal to refer questions to the 
ECJ.”
107
  However, neither the EPC nor the Implementing Regulations 
grant any authority to refer questions of law to the European Court of 
Justice.
108
  The conjunction of Rule 28(c) of EPC with Article 6(2)(c) of the 
Directive did not compel the conclusion that “the European Court of Justice 
now has jurisdiction to decide matters for the European Patent Office under 
the European Patent Convention.”
109
  The Biotechnology Directive should 
be used by the EPO only as a supplementary method of interpretation, not 
as a direct source.
110
  Therefore, the EBA believed that the EPO should not 
seek ECJ guidance. 
The EBA’s decision has had a significant and profound influence on the 
field of HESC research.  It has removed doubt on some fundamental issues 
and built a foundation of legal certainty for Rule 28(c).
111
  It unveiled the 
                                                          
1997 O.J. (L 213) 39 (“Whereas ordre public and morality correspond in particular to ethical 
or moral principles recognized in a member state, respect for which is particularly important 
in the field of biotechnology in view of the potential scope of inventions in this field and 
their inherent relationship to living matter; whereas such ethical or moral principles 
supplement the standard legal examinations under patent law regardless of the technical 
field of the invention.”). 
 104.  See Use of embryos/WARF, G 2/06 [2009] 5 OJ EPO 306.  
 105.  Id. at 312. 
 106.  See Rule 28 of EPC (providing that “under Article53(a), European patents shall not 
be granted in respect of biotechnological inventions which, in particular, concern the 
following: (a) processes for cloning human beings; (b) processes for modifying the germ 
line genetic identity of human beings; (c) uses of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes; (d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are 
likely to cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and 
also animals resulting from such processes”). 
 107.   WARF, G2/06 at 6. 
 108.  Id. G2/06 at 3. 
 109.  Id. at 6.  
 110.  Id. 
 111.   Min, supra note 33.  
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moral dilemma in patentability of HESC-related inventions and leaves 
space for evaluating the scope of Rule 28(c).
112
  Some scientists predicted 
that the decision would encourage European companies to develop new 
HESC technology because the old technology is not patentable.
113
 
3. Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace:  The decision by European Court of 
Justice on patenting HESC 
The ECJ and the EPO have similar concerns regarding the patentability 
of inventions involving human-embryo destruction.  In Oliver Brüstle v. 
Greenpeace,
114
 the ECJ addressed the same two questions as the WARF 
case—namely the definition of the term “human embryos” and the scope of 
“industrial or commercial use” under Article 6(2) of the Directive—before 
concluding that the invention was not patentable.
115
 The case involved a 
patent that had been overturned by the German Federal Patent Court.
116
  
The patent claims did not cover the production of HESC, but its methods of 
obtaining the cells were inevitably related to human-embryo destruction.
117
   
However, unlike the situation in WARF, the HESC in this case had been 




On March 10, 2011, the court concluded that, regardless of whether the 
description contained any reference to the use of embryos, the invention is 
not patentable since the patent “necessitates the prior destruction of human 
embryos.”
119
  The decision, authored by Judge Bot, appears to bring trouble 
                                                          
 112.  See, e.g., Pierre Treichel, Case Comment G2/06 and the Verdict of Immorality, 40 
INT’L. REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 450, 450 (2009) (positing an interpretation of 
prohibiting patents for “all the possible variants of the prohibited inventions in different 
circumstances”). 
 113.  See James Randerson, Europe Rejects Patent Governing Use of Embryonic Stem 
Cells, The Guardian (Nov. 27 2008), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2008/nov/27/embryonic-stem-cells-patent (discussing 
the implication the decision has on companies that develop technologies based on human 
embryonic stem cells).  
 114.  Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV. 200 E.C.R. I-09821 (2011). 
 115.  See id. at 23 (outlining two of the main questions in the case in determining 
whether the invention is patentable). 
 116.  German Patent No. DE 19756864 C5.  
 117.  See id. (claiming the isolation and purification of precursor cells generated from 
embryonic stem cells and explaining that embryonic stem cells emerge from pluripotent 
stem cells in the very early stages of the development of a fetus). 
 118.  The Embryo Protection Act, Federal Law Gazette, pt. 1 no. 69 (1991); see also Jan 
P. Beckmann, On the German Debate on Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 29 J. 
MED. & PHIL. 603-21 (discussing Germany’s allowance of HESC research based on the 
existing HESC lines). 
 119.  Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V., 8 (March 10, 2011), 
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beyond the patentability issue.
120
  For example, the ruling might encourage 
other countries to adopt restrictive approach or total bans on the research.
121
  
Some scholars have commented that the decision is too restrictive.
122
  They 
further state that without patent protection, the medical stem-cell industry 
will lose its incentive to develop HESC-based therapies.
123
  Some existing 
achievements, developed through research under the European 
Commission and various EU member states, would also be nullified by a 
ban on patentability.
124
  Finally, these commentators express hope that the 




The ECJ’s Grand Chamber ruled against patentability on October 18, 
2011.
126
  The ECJ held that even already-existing HESC have been 
harvested from human embryos.
127
  Therefore, inventions involving either 
newly derived HESC or HESC obtained from established stem cell lines 
are excluded from patentability.
128
 Moreover, “use for industrial or 
commercial purposes” under Article 6(2) includes the use of human 
embryos for scientific research.
129
  Austin Smith,
130
 who wrote a letter 
criticizing the March 10th decision, complained that, “we are funded to do 
research for the public good, yet prevented from taking our discoveries to 
                                                          
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=81836&pageIndex=0&doc
lang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=99614.  
 120.   Id. (stating that “the exclusion from patentability concerning the use of human 
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes [set out in Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive 
98/44] also covers the use of human embryos for purposes of scientific research,” only use 
of therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which is applied to the human embryo and is useful to 
it being patentable). 
 121.   See Alison Abbott, Europe Rules Against Stem-Cell Patents: Work with Human 
Embryonic Stem Cells is ‘Contrary to Ethics,’ 471 NATURE 280, 281 (2011). 
 122.  See id. at 281 (remarking that the opinion placed too much emphasis on cell-line 
origin and thus ignored the time at which a line has been established). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Austin Smith, No to Ban on Stem Cell Patents 472 Nature 418 (2011) (listing drug 
development and cell-replacement therapy as examples of achievements that would be 
nullified by a ban on patentability). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Case C-34/10, Brüstle v Greenpeace, 2011 E.C.R. I-9849, I-9876-77 (holding that 
“the exclusion from patentability concerning the use of human embryos . . . also covers the 
use of human embryos for the purposes of scientific research”).  
 127.   Id. 
 128.   Id. 
 129.  Id. at I-9877 (holding that only uses for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes are not 
barred from patent under Article 6(2)). 
 130.  See Smith, supra note 125 (Austin Smith is affiliated with the Welcome Trust 
Centre for Stem Cell Research at the University of Cambridge).  
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the market place where they could be developed into new medicines.”
131
  
The verdict might have the unfortunate effect of driving stem cell scientists 
out of Europe and blocking the development of some therapies derived 
from stem cells. 
From the Brüstle ruling, we can conclude that the EU has erected a 
barrier to patenting HESC-related inventions.  Moral considerations are 
deeply rooted in the EU—even in the UK, which has liberal policies 
towards HESC research.
132
  Despite the huge efforts made in the HESC 
regulations, there remains an inconsistency related to whether a moral 
examination is properly an element of patent law.
133
  The ECJ and the 
EPO’s dual system of assessing morality standards has resulted in legal 
uncertainty.  Therefore, we should reconsider how far patent law can 
accommodate the morality issues.  This article argues, the EPO should not 
take the responsibility of examining the morality of HESC inventions:  it 
would be better to leave such decisions to the Ethics Committee.
134
 
II CHINA: INCONSISTENT MORAL STANDARDS BETWEEN PATENT LAW AND 
PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
Compared to the EU, China’s policy on HESC-related research and 
applications is relatively liberal and supported by Chinese culture and 
values.
135
  Because the Chinese people have reached a consensus that 
abortion is legal, in China, embryos are not typically treated as persons.
136
   
                                                          
 131.  Emma, European Court Bans Stem-Cell Patents, EURO STEM CELL (Oct. 18, 2011) 
http://www.eurostemcell.org/node/21554. 
 132.  See Department of Health & Social Security, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF 
INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (“The Warnock Report”) (1984), 
available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/2068.html (providing a dissenting view from those in 
the UK who believe the human embryo has a special status and should not be used for 
research,). But see Aurora Plomer, Beyond the HFE Act 1990: The Regulation of Stem Cell 
Research in the UK, 10 MED. L. REV. 132, 133 (2002) (“The UK currently stands alone in 
Europe in permitting the creation of human embryos specifically for research purposes, 
including the use of cloning techniques.”). 
 133.  See Laurie, supra note 2, at 61 (“[D]espite the fact that disquiet and discussions of 
an ethic nature held up the adoption of the biotechnology Directive for so long, it is far from 
clear that we are any further forward in developing uniform, logical, principled and 
defensible ethical guidelines within European patent law.”). 
 134.    Ethical committee should involve individuals from diverse backgrounds who support 
HESC research with three major functions: providing clinical ethics consultation, 
developing or revising policies on HESC research, and monitoring research and clinical 
ethics. 
 135.  Döring, supra note 15, at 236 (stating that “[t]he Chinese believe in the importance 
of individual autonomy, but they also believe that this right of autonomy is guided by social 
needs”). 
 136.  Fu Jun Ying & Zhao Yun Hua, Analysis of Related Policy, Funds and Outputs on 
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Generally, human embryo use is not considered to be immoral by the 
Chinese.
137
  However, similar to the EPC, the Patent Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) also contains a moral prohibition.
138
  Specifically, 
Article 5 of the PRC states that “patent right shall not be granted for 
invention-creations that violate the law or social ethics, or harm public 
interests.”
139
 According to the Commission on Legislative Affairs, the 
social morality standard depends on public acceptability.
140
  If an invention 
is accepted by the public and allowed under the moral standard, it can be 
patented.
141
  Conversely, inventions such as artificial human organs for 




A. Whether Article 5 of the patent law excludes inventions related to 
HESC? 
As shown by the following analysis, HESC differentiation and culturing 
methods are both prohibited by the patent law.  In addition, preparations of 
pre-implantation embryo for therapeutic cloning use are not patentable.  
However, inventions related to existing HESC lines are not contrary to 
morality under the Article 5 of Patent Law.
143
 
1. Advanced Cell Technology related to the differentiation of HESC and its 




 January 24, 2005 patent application 
                                                          
Stem Cells in China, 15 J.  CLINICAL REHABILITATIVE TISSUE ENGINEERING RESEARCH 256, 
257 (2011). 
 137.  Liu Lidong, Analysis of the Possibility Apply for Patent of Human Embryonic Stem 
Cell, 30 HOSP. MGMT. FORUM 9, 11 (2013).  
 138.  See Article 5 of Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6511.  
 139.  Id.   
 140.   The Development and Morality of Human Embryonic Stem Cell, The State 
Intellectual Property Office of P.R.C, available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/mtjj/2006/200804/t20080401_362185.html. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  See generally Part II Chapter 1, Guidelines for Patent Examination, State 
Intellectual Property Office, People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Jan. 21, 2010, effective Feb. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6511 (listing types of inventions for which 
no patent can be granted). 
 143.  See id.; see also the patent law of People’s Republic of China, available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/zl/fljxzfg/200812/t20081230_435796.html. 
 144.  See generally Company Overview, ACT: ADVANCED CALL TECHNOLOGY, 
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covered methods for improved cell-based therapies for retinal degeneration 
and for differentiating HESC.
145
 Initially, the claims covered the 
differentiation of HESC into retinal pigment epithelial cells used to treat 
retinal degeneration.
146
 Under Article 5, the patent could not be granted 
unless it deleted that claim.
147
 
A similar situation also occurred in the context of Beijing University’s 
May 17, 2006 patent application related to a method for culturing HESC in 
a special culturing medium.
148
  The patent applicant deleted claims 
involving HESC culturing before the patent was granted.
149
  Likewise, the 
authorization of a patent application covering methods of preparing feeder-
cell-free, xeno-free HESC and stem-cell cultures specified the elimination 




It is well established in this case that patent could not be granted to the 
differentiation of HESC and its culture method.  However, neither 
“embryo” nor “industrial or commercial purpose” were defined in this case.  
Although the Chinese Patent Office encountered the same problems as the 
European Office,
151
 it neither provided any explicit explanation nor offered 
                                                          
http://www.advancedcell.com/about-act/company-overview/ (last visited July 15, 2014) 
(giving background on Advanced Cell Technology, Inc., a biotechnology company that 
specializes in the development of cellular therapies using stem cell-based technologies). 
 145.  Patent Application No. CN 1968608 A, May 23, 2007, available at 
http://www.google.com/patents/CN1968608A?cl=en (claiming methods for improved cell-
based therapies for retinal degeneration and for differentiating HESC and human embryo-
derived retinal cells). 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Patent Application No. CN 1844374 A, May 17, 2006, available at 
http://www.google.com/patents/CN1844374A?cl=fr (“Culture method for human embryonic 
stem cell and special culture medium thereof.”). 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Patent Application No. CN 100549163C, Oct. 14, 2009, available at 
http://www.google.com.tr/patents/CN100549163C?cl=zh-CN (relating to the use of feeder 
cells for the method of propagating a culture system and a human embryotic stem cell line); 
Patent Application No. CN 1748025A, Mar. 15, 2006, available at 
http://www.google.com.tr/patents/CN1748025A?cl=zh-CN (claiming a method of 
preparation of feeder cells-free, xeno-free human embryonic stem cells and stem cell 
cultures). 
 151.  Brian Salter, Governing Stem Cell Science in China and India: Emerging 
Economics and the Global Politics of Innovation, 27 NEW GENETICS & SOCIETY 145, 154 
(2008) (stating that with its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, 
China agreed to conform to the requirements of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. Since then China has cooperated frequently with the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the European Patent Office (EPO) on 
personnel training and promoted IPR teaching and research in over seventy universities); see 
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any approach for future judgment. 
2. Shanghai Genon Biological Product: HESCs with the possibility of 
developing into human being are within the scope of “human embryo” 
On November 2 1999, Shanghai Genon Biological Product Co. Ltd.’s 
(“Genon”) patent referred to the preparation of pre-implantation embryos 
for therapeutic cloning use.
152
 The publication date of the patent application 
was July 11, 2001.
153
  In 2003, the PRC’s Intellectual Property Office 
(IPO) rejected the application pursuant to Article 5.  The decision was 
made for the several reasons.  First, the method used in the invention 
involved mixing a donor nuclear cell and non-mammal cytoplasm derived 
from donor oocytes.  The reconstructed cell is stimulated and transplanted 
into non-human mammals.
154
 Finally, the cell is developed into early 
embryos, which is contrary to the morality provisions under the Article 5.  
The IPO held that because the cell contains complete genetic information, 
the early embryo should be identified as a human embryo.  The preparation 
method for an early embryo is equivalent to human cloning.  Therefore, the 
invention falls within the moral exclusion of Article 5.
155
  Second, the IPO 
held that the invention was for industrial and commercial purposes, and 
therefore violated Article 5.
156
  Third, as stated in the patent claim, the 
                                                          
also Tang Huadong and Wang Dapeng, The Analysis of the Patentability of Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell, 5 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 52, 54 (2013). 
 152.  Shanghai Genon Biological Product Co. Ltd. became the high and new technology 
enterprise in Shanghai, Little Giant Breeding enterprise, important enterprise of feed 
industry in Shanghai and the main unit which drafts out the national standard of “[s]pray 
dried globin protein powder for feed.” The company has taken on a large number of special 
government projects such as an industrialization project of high and new technologies from 
National Development and Reform Commission, National Spark Plan, an innovation fund 
for medium and small enterprise, domestic cooperation projects in Shanghai, which 
“develop agriculture by science and technology projects” in Shanghai, and “four news” 
technology projects in Shanghai, available at http://www.cngenon.com/ 




 154.  See The 5972 re-examination decision by the patent review committee, available at 
http://app.sipo-reexam.gov.cn/reexam_out/searchdoc/decidedetail.jsp?jdh=FS5972&lx=fs; 
see also Wu Zhou Min, The 5972 Re-examination Decision by the Patent Review 
Committee-the Preparation of Pre-implantation Embryos for Therapeutic Cloning Use, 
available at http://www.bioipr.com/biopharma-ipr/1108/. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Wu Zhou Min, The 5972 Re-examination Decision by the Patent Review 
Committee- the Preparation of Pre-implantation Embryos for Therapeutic Cloning Use, 
available at http://www.bioipr.com/biopharma-ipr/1108/.  
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In 2004, Genon appealed to the patent review committee making several 
arguments.  First, although the embryo includes human genetic 
information, the embryo is a human-animal hybrid, not a human embryo.  
Thus, the invention is not related to the industrial or commercial use of a 
human embryo.
158
  Second, the embryo created by this method has no 
possibility of becoming human because claims 1-10 of the application 
contain no human-cloning steps.
159
  Third, the invention represented one 
aspect of human organ transplantation technology.
160
  Therefore, the 
invention is properly classified as therapeutic cloning. Neither its aim nor 
its method involved human cloning.  In conclusion, the invention did not 
contravene the law, morality, or the public interest.
161
  
Yet the committee reexamined the patent application and concluded that 
the invention is unlawful based on Article 5 for two reasons.
162
  First, the 
nuclei donor’s genetic information had a decisive impact on the cell’s 
overall performance. Genon’s patent application contained human nuclei 
materials that possessed the characteristics of human cells.
163
  As claimed 
in the patent application, the invention is primarily used for the purpose of 
tissue or organ transplantation.  If so, the invention could not exclude the 
possibility of developing into a human being.  However, the committee did 
not ignore the possibility that the embryonic cells could exhibit the 
characteristics of an animal.
164
  In that situation, the method still violates 
public morality because it changes the genetic identity of a human germ 
line.  Second, the claim does not exclude the possibility of the early 
embryos developing into humans.  Genon did not provide any evidence to 
prove that the embryos could not develop into human being.
165
  It has been 
speculated that HESC has the legal status of human being since HESC 
comes with the possibility of developing into human being. Therefore, the 
inventions related to HESC are against public morality under Article 5 of 
patent law.  The argument in this case seems to provide an interpretation of 
“human embryo.” However, many ambiguous aspects remain, especially in 
                                                          
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id; see also Liu Lidong, Analysis of the Possibility Apply for Patent of Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell, 30 HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT FORUM 9, 11 (2013). 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
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how broadly or narrowly to construe the possibility of HESCs developing 
into a human being. 
3. Case the Regents of the University of California: It is improper to trace 
the origin of the world’s first HESC lines; therefore, established stem cell 
lines are allowed 
The next patent application that we consider was filed by the Regents of 
the University of California in 2003 and covered oligodendrocytes derived 
from HESC for remyelination and the treatment of spinal-cord injuries.
166
  
The IPO held that this invention violated Articles 5 and 22 of the PCR.
167
  
The committee believed that the patent specification and claims in their 
entirety related to HESCs obtained from human embryos, thus violating 
social morality through the use of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes.  In addition, the pluripotent cell derived from non-
embryonic tissue required bone marrow or other human or animal tissues 
through a surgical method for non-therapeutic purposes.  Thus, the 
invention could not satisfy the utility standard set forth in Article 22.
168
 
The applicant appealed to the patent review committee on the following 
two grounds.  First, the HESC aspect of the invention had been removed 
from the patent specification, and the cell lines used in the invention belong 
to established, mature, already-commercialized HESC lines.
169
   Second, 
                                                          
 166.  See the 42698 re-examination decision of the patent review committee, available at 
http://app.sipo-reexam.gov.cn/reexam_out/searchdoc/decidedetail.jsp?jdh=42698&lx=fs. 
 167.  Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. of the Seventh Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 4, 1992, effective January 1, 1993) 
Article 5 http://www.chinatrademarkoffice.com/about/laws2.html#2 (providing that “No 
patent right shall be granted for any invention-creation that is contrary to the laws of the 
State or social morality or that is detrimental to public interest.”); Patent Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Seventh Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Sept. 4, 1992, effective January 1, 1993) Article 22 
http://www.chinatrademarkoffice.com/about/laws2.html#2. (“Any invention or utility model 
for which patent right may be granted must possess novelty, inventiveness and practical 
applicability. ‘Novelty’ means that, before the date of filing, no identical invention or utility 
model has been publicly disclosed in publications in the country or abroad or has been 
publicly used or made known to the public by any other means in the country, nor has any 
other person filed previously with the patent office an application which described the 
identical invention or utility model and was published after the said date of filing. 
‘Inventiveness’ means that, as compared with the technology existing before the date of 
filing the invention has prominent substantive features and represents a notable progress and 
that the utility model has substantive features and represents progress. ‘Practical 
Applicability’ means that the invention or utility model can be made or used and can 
produce effective results.”). 
 168.  Id.  
 169.  Id. 
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the application’s claims explicitly excluded direct decomposition from the 
human-embryo or HESC-related technology solution.  In addition, the 




With respect to Article 5, the applicant argued that the origin of HESC 
lines should not be traced in perpetuity.
171
  The starting material of the 
application consisted of established HESC lines capable of unlimited in 
vitro proliferation.  In the prior art, there are many ways to obtain mature 
and stable HESC lines.  Moreover, it is improper to trace the origin of the 
world’s first HESC lines.  Using established HESC lines could decrease 
human-embryo abuse and in turn, limit the use of HESCs to mature strains. 




The board recognized that it is inappropriate to trace the origin of HESC 
lines, and that using established stem cell lines is allowed by the morality 
provisions in the patent law.  However, in the following decision 24343 
made by the Patent Reexamination Committee, the committee held that 
although HESCs could be obtained from commercial channels, the source 
of HESCs still rely on the destruction of the human embryo.
173
  More 
definitively, the culture of HESCs had significant problems like being time-
consuming, difficult to operate, and easy to contaminate.  As a result, 
established cell lines are not the steady and long-term source of HESC.  
Subsequently, the argument that using established HESCs could end the 
destruction of human embryo was unrealistic.
174
 
The uncertainty decision promulgated by the Patent Office is due to the 
misunderstanding of the moral provision.
175
  The moral standard as well as 
the relevant definition should be clarified and developed as soon as 
possible. 
                                                          
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  The 24343 re-examination decision of the patent review committee, available at 
http://app.sipo-reexam.gov.cn/reexam_out/searchdoc/decidedetail.jsp?jdh=FS24343&lx=fs. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  See Warren-Jones, supra note 52, at 660 (observing that the lack of consensus in 
the supplication of the morality provision suggests that there is a fundamental 
misunderstanding regarding the definition and application of the provision. The closer this 
analysis gets to achieving an operative understanding of the provision, the greater recourse 
to commentators to bridge the gaps in practice). 
JIANG_ FINAL (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2015  1:25 PM 
2015 BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS 81 
B. Low moral status of human embryos in practical application 
Contrary to popular assumptions, Chinese people place value on life.
176
 
Based on Confucian philosophy, life begins at birth.
177
  A human embryo 
holds the status of a pre-human being.  Accordingly, the moral status of a 
human embryo is not equal that of a human-being. Moreover, abortion is 
not prohibited and is sometimes compulsory under China’s “one-child 
policy.”
178
  A survey about the moral status of HESC research carried out 
in hospitals shows that more than fifty percent of doctors believe that 
human embryos are not human beings and that more than seventy percent 
of doctors support HESC research.
179
  Under China’s civil law, civil rights 
begin at birth.
180
 A fetus is not a legal entity: in other words, fetuses are not 
human-beings. 
Therefore, China’s moral standards are very different from those of 
Western countries.  Even considering the existence of varying local 
circumstances, China has a much lower moral standard related to HESC 
research than do Western countries.
181
 
C. High moral status of the human embryo in patent law 
The first edition of China’s patent law was drafted with reference to the 
patent law of other countries, particularly the UK.
182
 Article 5 of the Patent 
                                                          
 176.  Achim Rosemann, Life Without Value? Voices of Embryo Donors for hESC 
Research in China, IIAS NEWSLETTER (Winter 2009), at 17 (concluding that “[e]qually 
flawed appears the assumption that due to the high number of abortions carried out in the 
context of the one-child policy, the value of early forms of human life are generally of low 
regard among Chinese people.”). 
 177.  Han Xin, The Ideological of Confucius, available at 
http://www.confuchina.com/10%20lishi/kongzi%20sixiang.htm.  
 178.  Jing-Bao Nie, Behind The Silence. Chinese Voices On Abortion 100, 104 (2005). 
 179.   Qiu Xiang Xing, Gao Zhi Yan, Wang De Yan, Wang Ming Xv, Shen Ming Xian 
and Chen Ren Biao, A SURVEY AND DISCUSSION ON ETHICAL ISSUES OF HUMAN EMBRYONIC 
STEM CELL RESEARCH, 1 MED. & PHILO. 8 (2004). 
 180.  See General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(effective January 1, 1987) Article 9 P.R.C. Laws (providing that “[a] citizen shall have the 
capacity for civil rights from birth to death and shall enjoy civil rights and assume civil 
obligations in accordance with the law”). 
 181.  See Margaret E. Sleeboom-Faulkner, National Risk Signatures and Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research in Mainland China, 12 HEALTH, RISK & SOC’Y 491, 496-97 
(2010) (describing that “[w]hen in 2001 President Bush announced a moratorium on the 
federal funding of stem cell research, China, as some other countries in Asia (India, 
Singapore, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan), denied any engagement with the ethics that had 
informed the decision. In fact, they were ready to jump into the bioethical vacuum it had 
created. This vacuum was alleged to be a result of Western moral scruples about using 
fertilised human cells, allegedly absent in the East.”). 
 182.  Wei Dong, Study on Patentability of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Related 
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law of P.R.C. is the same as Article 53 of the European Directive.
183
  
Additionally, in the later revision to the patent law, Article 5 was not 
substantially modified. Is it proper to include a moral exclusion in the 
patent law though?  This article takes the view that patent law should not 
be used as a tool to prohibit unethical research because the law’s primary 
goals are to protect inventions and encourage creation.  The principles and 
clauses contained in the patent law should represent the spirit of that law. 
With respect to moral exclusions, HESC research could still be continued 
or sponsored in the absence of patent protection for the resulting 
products.
184
  For example, in China, unverified stem cell therapy could be 
carried out in the clinics and hospitals.
185
 
Although China’s moral standards seem to be lower than those of 
Western countries in practical application, according to the patent-
examination guidelines, it is forbidden to patent the use of embryos for 
commercial or industrial purposes.
186
  As in Europe, the Chinese patent 
regulations contain no direct definition of “embryo” or “commercial or 
industrial purpose.”  Thus, the Chinese patent office has encountered the 
same problems as the European office.  However, unlike Europe, Chinese 
regulators have not needed to consider the issue of conflicting moral 
standards among member states. 
Since China’s moral standards on this issue are much lower than those in 
Europe,
187
 it is likely that Chinese regulators have adopted the moral 
exclusion in patent law primarily due to the belief that it  represents an 
international custom.  In response to pressures from stem cell markets, 
some scientists from countries with restrictive policies will rush areas that 
                                                          
Inventions, East China University of Political Science and Law, master thesis (2011).  
 183.  European Directive 98/44/EC on Biotechnology. 
 184.  See Laurie, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 64 (stating how one 
ay argue that the absence of patent protection may discourage research but not researching 
would be an inefficient manner to tackle moral concerns and thus research will continue). 
 185.  See Lianming Liao & Robert Chunhua Zhao, An Overview of Stem Cell-Based 
Clinical Trials in China, 17 STEM CELLS & DEV. 613, 615 (2008) (reporting that “the Fourth 
Military Medical University of China further used peripheral blood monocytes that had been 
induced to differentiate into functional hepatocytes in vitro to treat patients with hepatitis B 
virus (HBV)-related decompensated liver cirrhosis”); see also Haidan Chen, Stem Cell 
Governance in China: From Bench to Bedside?, 28 NEW GENETICS & SOCIETY 267, 2274 
(2009) (reporting that “Beike Biotech was set up in Shenzhen, the first special economic 
zone of China on 18 July 2005. It collaborates with hospitals and treats patients in the 
hospitals and then shares the resulting profit. Until 2008 Beike cooperated with thirteen 
hospitals; six centers were added in 2008, and five new centers will be initiated in 2009”). 
 186.   GUIDELINES FOR PATENT EXAMINATION, STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
 187.  See Liu Lidong, supra note 162. 
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have permissive policies or alternatively, some might engage in the 
activities conducted in more permissive areas.  Likewise, Chinese scientists 
and doctors will blur what can and cannot be done due to a lack of medical 
risks or moral concerns.  HESC research involving therapeutic cloning and 
other sensitive procedures cannot be effectively monitored, resulting in 
“biomedical adventurism”
188
 that could create a nightmare for the entire 
legal and social infrastructure. 
Therefore, it would be more appropriate or effective to issue a specific 
regulation related to moral standards for HESC research.  Any invention 
permitted by that specific law should be patentable.  Immoral research 
should be forbidden from the beginning instead of at the patent-application 
stage.
189
 Moreover, from an economic point of view, restricting immoral 
research from the beginning could save a tremendous amount of time and 
money.  It would be more effective to implement specific legal regulations 
applicable to HESC research than to include a general moral exclusion in 
the patent law. 
III. THE UNITED STATES: INCONSISTENT POLICIES ON FEDERAL FUNDING 
CONTROL OF HESC RESEARCH 
In the U.S., regulation of HESC research primarily centers on federal 
funding control, not moral control. The story of HESC regulations in the 
U.S. involves a battle between the executive and judicial branches, along 
with a battle between federal and state government.
190
  For decades, the 
primary moral concern addressed by HESC regulation involved whether an 
embryo is a legal person.
191
  Unlike in the EU and China, U.S. patent law 
does not contain a moral exclusion. According to Juicy Whip, Inc. v. 
Orange Bang, the United States Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit 
held that the Patent Office should not play a role in determining whether an 
invention is moral.
192
 In 1980, however, the United States Supreme Court 
                                                          
 188.  Doring, supra note 17, at 42 (commenting that the positivistic principle “if an 
action is not illegal, by definition, it is legal” does not apply in China. Taking advantage of 
the fact that policymaking lags behind scientific and economic development, in terms of the 
entire legal and social infrastructure, amounts to biomedical adventurism). 
 189.  Zhu Huan, Patentability of Embryonic Stem Cells Related Inventions, East China 
University of Political Science and Law, Master’s Thesis (2008).  
 190.  See Owen C. B. Hughes, Alan L Jakimo and Michael J. Malinowski, United States 
Regulation of Stem Cell Research: Recasting Government’s Role and Questions to be 
Solved, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 383 (2008) (overview of the development of U.S. law on 
stem cell research). 
 191.   G. Bahadur and M. Morrison, Patenting Human Pluripotent Cells: Balancing 
Commercial, Academic and Ethical Interests 25 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 14-21 (2010). 
 192.  Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding that a 
beverage dispenser that simulated a fake display of churning juice, when the juice was not in 
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opened the door to grant patents on “non-naturally occurring living 
substances” in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.
193
 Since then, thousands of genes, 
animals, and other organic materials have been the subjects of patent 
protection. 
A. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF):  the opening of 
“human embryo farms” 
The focal points of world debate on the issue of HESC are three 
fundamental patents held by the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation 
(“WARF”).  In 1998, after James Thomson published work on the isolation 
of embryonic stem cell lines, WARF (as his representative) applied to the 
USPTO to patent that work.  Three basic patents, known as the 780, 806 
and 913 patents, were issued.
194
  The claims of these patents are quite 
broad.
195
  Patents 780 and 806 claim product embryonic cells. Patent 913 
claims both product embryonic stem cells and the method of obtaining 
them. 
WARF holds a fee-based and royalty-bearing license to make, use, and 
sell HESC lines. WARF has been widely criticized for its restrictive policy 
towards educational and scientific institutions.
196
  In the commercial area, 
WARF transferred an exclusive license to Geron to develop products 
derived from the patents.  Because the patents cover broad HESC 
technology, any commercial potential is restricted to exploitation by 
                                                          
fact fresh lacked utility and was therefore unpatentable). 
 193.  See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (upholding application asserting 
thirty-six claims related to Chakrabarty’s invention of a bacterium from the genus 
Pseudomonas containing therein at least two stable energy-generating plasmids). The patent 
examiner allowed the claims falling into the first two categories, but rejected claims for the 
bacteria. Id. His decision rested on two grounds:  (1) that micro-organisms are products of 
nature and (2) that as living things they are not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 
101. Id. 
 194.  United States Patent No. 5,843,780, December 1, 1998 (covering a purified 
preparation of primate embryonic stem cells); United States Patent, 6,200,806, March 13, 
2001 (containing a purified preparation of pluripotent human embryonic stem cell); United 
States Patent, 7,029,913, April 18, 2006 (including a replicating in vitro cell culture of 
human embryonic stem cells comprising cells). 
 195.  See K. Bergman and G.D. Graff, The Global Stem Cell Patent Landscape: 
Implications for Efficient Technology Transfer and Commercial Development, 5 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 419, 419 (2007) (finding these patents are to be some of “the strongest 
intellectual property holdings in the whole stem cell field, establishing control at the very 
root of all possible lineages of cellular differentiation[.]”). 
 196.  See Aurora Plomer, Kenneth S Taymor and Christopher Thomas Scott, Challenges 
to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Patents, 2 CELL STEM CELL 13, 13 (2008) (criticizing 
WARF for slowing distribution of cell lines and cast a shadow over the ability of 
researchers to advance knowledge). 
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Although the three patents application were refused for reasons of moral 
concern by the EU, in the US, they were challenged for technical reasons.  
The Foundation for the Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, in conjunction 
with the New York-based Public Patent Foundation, challenged the patents 
on grounds of obviousness with respect to the prior art.
198
  In addition, 
biomedical researchers worried that the USPTO’s lax practices could stifle 
scientific innovation by granting patent holders overly broad rights over 
basic knowledge and research tools.
199
  In response to concerns related to 
impeding scientific and economic progress due to the lack of guidelines for 
its patenting criteria, the USPTO received both oppositions. 
Subsequently, WARF’s patent application was appealed amidst intense 
criticism.  One objection related to the cost and restrictiveness imposed on 
researchers by WARF’s licensing practices.
200
  However, it is possible that, 
the reason for the high cost of HESC research is the patent licensing fees.   
For example, the Thomson patents allow WARF to demand money from 
anyone who wants to use its stem cells, thus increasing the cost of research 
and restricting that research to those who can afford to pay.
201
  Critics have 
called WARF’s approach to licensing “overly costly, cumbersome and 
restrictive.”
202
  Although opponents of HESC research have attempted to 
use the patent system to stop what they consider unethical research, there is 
little basis in the U.S. patent law for moral barriers against the WARF 
patents.
203
  It appears that one of the reasons that no explicit morality clause 
                                                          
 197.  Rovert Lanza from Advanced Cell Technology in Worcester, Massachusetts, 
claimed that “we would be sued if we even tried to develop insulin-producing cells to treat 
diabetes.” Constance Holden, US Patent Office Casts Doubt on Wisconsin Stem Cell 
Patents, 316 SCIENCE MAGAZINE. 182, 182 (2007). 
 198.  Request for Ex Parte Reexamination of US Patent No. 5,843,780, Request for Ex 
Parte Reexamination of US Patent No 6,200,806, and Request for Inter Parties 
Reexamination of US Patent No 7,029,913.  
 199.   David B Resnik, Embryonic Stem Cell Patents and Human Dignity, 15 HEALTH 
CARE ANAL 211-222 (2007). 
 200.   See John M. Golden, WARF’s Stem Cell Patents and Tensions Between Public and 
Private Sector Approaches to Research, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 314, 315 (2010). 
 201.  See Terry Devitt, Wisconsin Scientists Culture Elusive Embryonic Stem Cells, 
(Nov. 6, 1998) available at http://www.news.wisc.edu/3327 (stating that finding ways to 
direct the human embryonic stem cells to become specific cells of clinical importance is an 
important next step required before new therapies can be developed). 
 202.  See Golden, supra note 200, at 315 (stating the WARF’s patents cover many HESC 
lines in the U.S. and have been used to assert control over many beyond the scope of the 
patent). 
 203.  Id. (analyzing that U.S. patent law provides comparatively little basis for such a 
morality-oriented barrier to WARF’s patents. Instead, challenges to WARF’s patents in the 
United States have attacked the value of Thomson’s scientific contribution). 
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exists in U.S. patent law is the lack of an intense debate and discussion in 
the U.S. over whether HESC should be considered patent-eligible subject 
matter. 
B. Political interventions—the federal funding control of HESC research 
under moral concerns 
It is necessary to have an overview of the core of U.S. political system—
the social contract—before looking into the specific issue of HESC.
204
 
With respect to HESC research, the question of whether stem cells are 
persons is not hotly debated in the U.S. Instead, the focus of the argument 
is whether federal funding should be granted for HESC research. Indeed, 
there are no federal regulations in the United States that restrict HESC 
research.  On the contrary, control over HESC research relates to the 
allocation of federal funding.
205
  There are three levels of federal funding of 
HESC research:  (1) complete prohibition, (2) limited prohibition, and (3) 
permission. For a long time, the government banned federal funding of any 
research that involved human embryos.
206
 
However, in 1996, pursuant to Executive Order 12,975, the National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission (“NBAC”) was established to protect “the 
rights and welfare of human research subjects and issues in the 
management and use of genetic information.”
207
 
NBAC’s establishment was a profound historical event in the regulation 
of HESC research because it “increased the awareness of U.S. and foreign 
governments, international groups, the research community, and the public 
about complex bioethical issues, thereby helping to provide a forum for 
public debate.”
208
  In the meantime, President Clinton required relevant 
                                                          
 204.  JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, 1-138 (1st ed., 2010) (stating 
that the social contract can be described as follows:  “Each of us puts his person and all of 
his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we 
receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole”). 
 205.  Christine Vestal, Stem Cell Research at the Crossroads of Religion and Politics, 
PEW FORUM PAPER (July 17, 2008), available at http://pewforum.org/Science-and-
Bioethics/Stem-Cell-Research-at-the-Crossroads-of-Religion-and-Politics.aspx. 
 206.  See PAUL MURRAY MCNEILL, THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF HUMAN 
EXPERIMENTATION  119 (1st ed., 1993) (providing an overview of  “balancing interests of 
researchers against the protection of the interests of subjects of human experimentation”); 
see also Kyla Dunn, The Politics of Stem Cells, NOVA SCIENCENOW (Jan. 4 2005) 
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/stem-cells-politics.html (discussing the 
illegality of using federal funds for “any experiment that creates or destroys a human 
embryo”). 
 207.  Exec. Order No. 12,975, 3 C.F.R. 1759  (1995). 
 208.  EISEMAN ELISA, THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION: CONTRIBUTING 
TO PUBLIC POLICY 130 (1st ed., 2003). 
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executive agencies, within the NBAC, to report their opinions on 
developing human-subject-protection policies.
209
 Based on an NBAC 
report, President Clinton signed the “Cloning Prohibition Act of 1997” to 
ban the creation of babies through somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning.
210
 
Although the history of federal involvement in HESC research is quite 
complex, these events are distinguishable from the jurisdictional battle over 
federal regulation of HESC research. 
1. The National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act:   Allow Federal 
Funding of Research Related to Embryos at the Early Stage 
The Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) is the chief 
U.S. government agency providing human services, granting federal 
research funds, and providing health insurance. HHS consists of eleven 
operating divisions.  Among these divisions, the National Institutes of 
Health (“NIH”) is responsible for funding biomedical and health-related 
research. Initially, research related to human subjects was prohibited from 
receiving federal funds. In September 1988, the NIH Advisory Committee 
voted to lift the moratorium on the use of federal funds for fetal-tissue 
transplantation research.
211
  In 1993, President Clinton, supported by the 




Next, the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act authorized 
federal funding of research involving human fetal tissue transplantation.
213
  
This Act also paved the way for federal funding of research related to 
early-stage embryos.
214
  With the endorsement of the National Institutes of 
                                                          
 209.  Mary Leinhos, The US National Bioethics Advisory Commission as a Boundary 
Organism, 32 SCI. & PUB. POL. 423, 426 (2005) (“The Commission was granted the 
authority to deliberate on additional issues raised by the general public, other federal bodies 
and organizations, or NBAC itself.”). 
 210.  Id. at 427 (stating that “[c]onsistent with the NBAC’s recommendation, the 
President’s legislative proposal contained a five-year prohibition on the use of somatic cell 
nuclear transfer to create human beings and directed the NBAC to report to the President 
after four and one-half years about whether to continue the ban.”). 
 211.  NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, HUMAN FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION RESEARCH 
(1988). 
 212.  Helen M. Maroney, Bioethical Catch-22:  The Moratorium on Federal Funding of 
Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research and the NIH Revitalization Amendments, 9 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y. 485, 487 (1993).  
 213.  Research on Human Fetal Tissue Amendments Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 289g-1 
note (2012). 
 214.  Doe v. Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 1421, 1424 (1994) (commenting on the Act as 
follows: “This law [the Revitalization Act] amended existing federal regulations governing 
research on human embryos, which required such research to be reviewed by an EAB before 
such research might proceed. Because prior presidential administrations apparently chose 
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Health Revitalization Act, in 1994, the NIH set up the Human Embryo 
Research Panel to develop policies for the use of embryos and the moral 
scope of that research. 
2. Dickey-Wicker Amendment:   No Federal Funding on HESC Research 
Involving Destruction of an Embryo 
Contrary to his previous position, President Clinton issued an executive 
order to ban federal funding of HESC research in the wake of a resounding 
Democratic electoral defeat.
215
  In 1995, consistent with President Clinton’s 
declaration, Congress overrode the decision to sponsor some types of stem-
cell research. The Dickey-Wicker Amendment, named for Representatives 
Jay Dickey and Roger Wicker, was approved by Congress.
216
  The Dickey-
Wicker Amendment is a rider to other legislation concerning HHS. It is the 
first regulation to focus specifically on embryo research and is also the 
United States’ most important regulation regarding HESC research.  
Subpart A of the Amendment reflects an endorsement of the existing 
prohibition on embryo creation.  Parallel to Subpart A, Subpart B adds a 
ban on federal funding of any research involving embryos obtained from in 
vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures.
217
  It is clear that research involved 
with the destruction of embryos is excluded from federal funding. 
However, the problem of research using already-destroyed embryos from 
IVF is still unsettled, which has led to debate. 
Despite the lack of federal funding, HESC research has developed and 
flourished with private support.  In 1998, scientists claimed that they had 
successfully derived stem cells from human embryos and emphasized the 
potential of stem cells to grow into specific cells.
218
  Following this 
                                                          
not to appoint an EAB, no funding for such research had in fact been approved. What the 
new law did was to reverse the conditions for in vitro fertilization research: it could go 
forward unless disapproved. Previously it could not go forward unless approved”). 
 215.  Heather J Meeker, Issues of Property, Ethics and Consent in the Transplantation of 
Fetal Reproductive Tissue, 9 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 185, 187 (1994) (citing profound ethical 
and moral questions associated with the subject, refused to follow the contrary 
recommendation of a National Institutes of Health panel). 
 216.   Dickey Amendment, Pub. L. 111-8, § 509, 123 Stat. 803 (1996). 
 217.  Id. (The Amendment’s prohibitions read as follows:  (a) None of the funds made 
available in this Act may be used for—(1) The creation of a human embryo or embryos for 
research purposes; (2) Research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, 
discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that allowed for 
research on fetuses in uteri. (b) For purposes of this section, the term ‘human embryo or 
embryos’ includes any organism, not protected as a human subject under 45 CFR 46 as of 
the date of the enactment of this Act, that is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, 
cloning, or any other means from one or more human gametes or human diploid cells). 
 218.  James A Thomson, Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts, 
282 SCI. 1145, 1145-46 (1998). 
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landmark development, on January 15, 1999, top HHS lawyer Harriet Rabb 
declared that the Dickey-Wicker Amendment should not apply to derived 
stem cells because such cells “are not a human embryo within the statutory 
definition.”
219
  Therefore, HHS took the position that the NIH could 
provide federal funding to HESC research on the ground that a stem cell 




In response to the HHS opinion, the NIH appointed a group of experts to 
develop appropriate guidelines.  Meanwhile, the notion that federal funds 
could be used for HESC research was backed by the Clinton 
administration.
221
  However, seventy-seven Congressional opponents wrote 
two letters to the Secretary of HHS to criticize the provision allowing 
federal funding to HESC research.
222
 
3. NIH Guideline 2000 
Regardless of the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act and the 
Dickey-Wicker Amendment’s contradictory interpretations, the NIH 
published a Guideline outlining funding-ineligible types of HESC 
research.
223
  The Guideline restricts the scope of federal funds to stem cells 
                                                          
 219.  See Letter from Harriet Rabb, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to 
Harold Varmus, Director, NIH, (Jan. 15, 1999) (General Counsel Rabb determined that the 
statutory ban on human embryonic research defined an embryo as an “organism” that, when 
implanted in the uterus, is capable of becoming a human being); see also JUDITH A JOHNSON 
& ERIN D WILLIAMS, CRS REPORT: STEM CELL RESEARCH: FEDERAL RESEARCH FUNDING 
AND OVERSIGHT, 7 (Apr. 18, 2007) available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33540.pdf.  
 220.  Meredith Wadman, Embryonic Stem Cell Research Exempt from Ban, NIH is Told, 
397 NATURE 185-86 (1999) (quoting an NIH official, “this opinion allows us to proceed 
carefully and thoughtfully with a line of research that has enormous potential for the 
treatment of almost every disease and condition”). 
 221.  See Eliot Marshall, Ethicists Back Stem Cell Research, White House Treads 
Cautiously, 285 SCI. 502, 503 (1999). 
 222.  Meredith Wadman, Congress May Block Stem Cell Research, 397 NATURE 639, 
639 (1999) (The writer claimed that Rabb “makes a specious distinction by reading the law 
narrowly” to apply only to the act of destroying embryos, and not more broadly to include 
any research that depends on their destruction; Jay Dickey, the author of the existing ban, 
also stated that stem-cell derivation was “precisely the kind of research for which we 
intended to ban, and did ban, federal funding”). 
 223.  Clinton administration NIH Guidelines for embryonic stem cell funding, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 51,975, Aug. 25, 2000. The Guidelines state that the following research areas are 
ineligible for NIH funding:  
A. The derivation of pluripotent stem cells from human embryos; B. Research in 
which human pluripotent stem cells are utilized to create or contribute to a human 
embryo; C. Research utilizing pluripotent stem cells derived from human embryos 
created for research purposes, rather than for fertility treatment; D. Research in 
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derived from ‘human embryos created for the purposes of fertility 
treatment and exceeded the clinical need of the individuals seeking such 
treatment’.
224
  The Guideline also established a national review panel, the 
NIH Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Review Group.
225
 
However, before the NIH could provide funding, the Bush 
Administration took power and conducted a legal review of Clinton-era 
policy. Implementation of the Guideline was halted and federal funding 
was never granted. Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration had already 
opened the door for federal funding of HESC research.
226
 
4. The Bush Compromise accepted the narrow explanation of Dickey-
Wicker Amendment but exercised the executive power instead of legal 
power to allocate funding 
Immediately after President Bush took office in January 2001, he 
ordered “another look at the options regarding HESC research policy,” 
including a review of Rabb’s decision.
227
  Next, President Bush articulated 
his own policy by suspending the NIH’s implementation of funding and 
repealing the NIH Guideline.
228
  Some scientists and patients expressed 
anger and frustration with this decision.
229
 
                                                          
which human pluripotent stem cells were derived using somatic cell nuclear 
transfer, i.e., the transfer of a human somatic cell nucleus into a human or animal 
egg; E. Research utilizing human pluripotent stem cells derived using somatic cell 
nuclear transfer, i.e., the transfer of a human somatic cell nucleus into a human or 
animal egg; F. Research in which human pluripotent stem cells are combined with 
an animal embryo; and G. Research in which human pluripotent stem cells are used 
in combination with somatic cell nuclear transfer for the purposes of the 
reproductive cloning of a human. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Nicholas Wade, New Rules on Use of Human Embryos in Cell Research, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Aug. 24, 2000) http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/24/us/new-rules-on-use-of-
human-embryos-in-cell-research.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
(President Clinton commented that the Guideline was a proper because “we cannot walk 
away from the potential to save lives and improve lives, to help people literally to get up and 
walk, to do all kinds of things we could never have imagined”). 
 226.  Kyla Dunn, The Politics of Stem Cells, NOVA SCIENCE NOW, (Sept. 13, 2014, 3:37 
PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/stem-cells-politics.html. 
 227.  The President’s Council on Bioethics, The Administration’s Human Embryonic 
Stem Cell Research Funding Policy:  Moral and Political Foundations, THE PRESIDENT’S 
COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS (Sept. 13, 2014, 4:11 PM), 
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/index.html.  
 228.  Id.  
 229.  Rick Weiss, Bush Administration Order Halts Stem Cell Meeting; NIH Planned 
Session to Review Fund Requests, WASH. POST, at A02 (Apr. 21, 2001) (reporting that one 
member of NIH criticized that “the decision certainly is holding up research that could 
potentially affect many of people with a number of different diseases . . . .  Nobel laureate 
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On August 9, 2001, President Bush launched his newly crafted policy for 
HESC research in a national television speech. He announced that to avoid 
sanctioning or encouraging further destruction of human embryos, federal 
grants would only be available for research using the sixty four stem cell 
lines that were already in existence.
230
 
President Bush’s view on the ethics of HESC research were quite 
different from that of President Clinton.
231
 Stem cell separation results in 
the deprivation of the embryo’s human potential because it destroys the 
embryo. Thus, President Bush decided to “allow federal funds to be used 
for research on these existing stem cell lines, where the life-and-death 
decision has already been made.”
232
 
After the new policy was implemented, its moral, legal, and political 
implications were hotly debated among media, politicians, scientists, and 
organizations. The Bush policy was known as “The Bush Compromise.” 
One reason for that characterization is that the policy apparently straddles 
the line between the conservative and liberal views on the question of 
governing federal funding. Another possible reason is that the policy tried 
to satisfy both the scientific communities and pro-life communities.
233
 To 
some extent, The Bush Compromise accepted the narrow view exemplified 
by the Dickey-Wicker Amendment. However, The Bush Compromise also 
adopted a new, broad concept of embryonic human life. In addition, The 
Bush Compromise changed the executive and legislative branches’ 
positions on the question of federal funding for HESC research.  It not only 
acknowledged Congress’s sole authority to legislate but also exercised 
                                                          
Paul Berg feared that U.S. researchers stand to lose their edge in the biomedical revolution 
because Britain, France and Canada have been passing more liberal rules for research on 
embryo cells”). 
 230.  Press Release, White House, White House Fact Sheet on Embryonic Stem Cell 
Research (Aug. 9, 2001), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=79025.. 
(The new policy provided as follows: “Federal funds will only be used for research on 
existing stem cell lines that were derived: (1) with the informed consent of the donors; (2) 
from excess embryos created solely for reproductive purposes; and (3) without any financial 
inducements to the donors. No federal funds will be used for: (1) the derivation or use of 
stem cell lines derived from newly destroyed embryos; (2) the creation of any human 
embryos for research purposes; or (3) the cloning of human embryos for any purpose”). 
 231.  Press release, George W. Bush, President George W.Bush’s Address on Stem Cell 
Research (Aug. 9, 2001), available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/08/09/bush.transcript/ (describing the embryo 
as “a snowflake in that each of these embryos is unique, with the unique genetic potential of 
an individual human being” and recommending that under the Bush policy, “a five-day-old 
cluster of stem cells is not an embryo, not yet an individual, but a pre-embryo”). 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Patrick Walsh, Stemming the Tide of Stem Cell Research:  The Bush Compromise, 
38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1061, 1077 (2005). 
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executive power to allocate funding.
234
  This new policy inevitably raised 
many concerns that scientists might move to other countries.
235
 
5. The Report from the President Council on Bioethics clarified that the 
enforcement law was the Dickey Amendment 
Following a public announcement on August 9th, President Bush 
established the Presidential Council on Bioethics. According to the Kass 
statement, the Council aims to provide “an adequate moral and ethical lens 
through which to view particular developments in their proper scope and 
depth.”
236
   It was quite different from previous councils because the White 
House was in charge of appointing its members.  Chairman Kass 
proclaimed that the Council would listen to both religious and secular 
voices in its consideration of HESC research. 
Following its proceedings, in January 2004, the Council published a 
report on monitoring stem-cell research.  The report summarizes ethical, 
legal and policy issues around applications of stem cell research.
237
  The 
report concluded that the Dickey-Wicker Amendment was enforceable law.  
Federal funds should not be used to “encourage the exploitation or 
destruction of nascent human life, even if scientific and medical benefits 
might come from such acts.”
238
  The research should aim to cure deadly 
diseases provided it respects important moral boundaries. Meanwhile, the 
award of federal funding is a significant issue to be handled with care.
239
 
                                                          
 234.  O. Carter Snead, The Pedagogical Significance of the Bush Stem Cell Policy: A 
Window into Bioethical Regulation in the United States, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y. L. & 
ETHICS 491, 498 (2005) (demonstrating “both an acknowledgement of Congress’s sole 
authority to appropriate federal funds and a robust exercise of the President’s authority as 
head of the executive branch to allocate the appropriated funding according to the 
[a]dministration’s priorities”). 
 235.  See Tom Abate, UCSF Stem Cell Expert Leaving U.S./Scientist Fears That 
Political Uncertainty Threatens His Research, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 17, 2001, 
http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/UCSF-stem-cell-expert-leaving-U-S-Scientist-
2899802.php (documenting one biology professor’s move from San Francisco to Britain in 
order to continue his research on human embryonic stem cells). 
 236.  See Monitoring Stem Cell Research: Reports by the President’s Council on 
Bioethics (Jan. 2004), available at https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/.  
 237.  See Letter from Leon R. Kass M.D., Chairman of the President’s Council on 
Bioethics, to President Bush (March 31, 2004), available at 
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/transmittal.html 
(summarizing the main points addressed in the report). 
 238.   Patrick Walsh, Stemming the Tide of Stem Cell Research: The Bush Compromise, 
38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1061, 1077 (2005). 
 239.  Id. at 1078 (proposing a four-part test to determine status of embryotic tissue for 
research and suggesting the President Bush institute a federal agency to oversee subsequent 
research). 
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The council also announced reports on alternative sources of stem cells, 
human cloning, human dignity, and bioethics.  However, these reports did 
not have a substantial effect on public debate in the U.S.
240
  The Council’s 
approach was criticized as “entertaining with the spectacle of enhanced 




6. Executive order by President Obama: Reversing The Bush Compromise 
Its practical import aside, The Bush Compromise had pedagogical 
significance for legal developments in regulating HESC research.  The 
General Council of the President’s Council on Bioethics evaluated The 
Bush Compromise as “provid[ing] an unparalleled window into the nature 
and substance of ‘bioethical regulation’ within the unique framework of the 
American system of government.”
242
  However, President Obama has 




On March 9, 2009, President Obama signed an executive order to lift the 
ban on HESC funding.  Research related to embryonic stem cell lines 
created after August 2001 could receive federal funding.  Privately funded 
research was not affected.  However, the creation of stem cell lines 




The order did not clearly describe standards for which stem cell lines 
would be eligible for federal funds.  The rule unlocking federal funding 
was challenged by the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, which prohibited 
                                                          
 240.  Leigh Turner, Science, Politics and the President’s Council on Bioethics, 22 
NATURE BIOTECH. 509, 509 (2004) (commenting that while the reports did not have “a 
dramatic effect on public debates,” the recent membership shake up in the US President’s 
Council put the Council “back in the limelight”). 
 241.  Leigh Turner, Has the President’s Council on Bioethics Missed the Boat?, 327 THE 
BMJ 629, 629 (2003). 
 242.  See Snead, supra note 235 at 234, at 492. 
 243.  Obama Overturns Bush Policy on Stem Cells, CNN (Mar. 9, 2009), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-03-09/politics/obama.stem.cells_1_cancer-and-spinal-cord-
embryonic-cell-research?_s=PM:POLITICS (quoting President Obama where he 
commented that “[i]n recent years, when it comes to stem cell research, rather than 
furthering discovery, our government has forced what I believe is a false choice between 
sound science and moral values”); see also Exec. Order No. 13,505, 3 C.F.R. 229 (2010). 
 244.  See Exec. Order No. 13,505, 3 C.F.R. 229 (2010) (stating that Section 1 of the 
executive order provides as follows: “Research involving human embryonic stem cells and 
human non-embryonic stem cells has the potential to lead to better understanding and 
treatment of many disabling diseases and conditions.  Advances over the past decade in this 
promising scientific field have been encouraging, leading to broad agreement in the 
scientific community that the research should be supported by Federal funds”). 
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funding of HESC research involving the destruction of embryos.  The NIH 
attempted to finish answering a host of morally and politically complicated 
questions within 120 days.
245
  Because the order was challenged by the 
Dickey-Wicker Amendment, the President let Congress decide whether to 
overturn the statutory ban on federal funding on research related to 
embryo.
246
  Despite some weaknesses in the order, it is still a remarkable 
milestone in HESC research and as President Obama commented: 
Today, with the Executive Order I am about to sign, we will bring 
the change that so many scientists and researchers; doctors and 
innovators; patients and loved ones have hoped for, and fought 
for, these past eight years: we will lift the ban on federal funding 
for promising embryonic stem cell research.  We will vigorously 
support scientists who pursue this research.  And we will aim for 




7. The result of the battle over the Dickey-Wicker Amendment: The Obama 
Administration funding policy of HESC research could move forward 
NIH planned to implement new guidelines to suggest how federal funds 
should be used for HESC research.
248
  This was welcome news to scientists 
who had applauded President Obama’s new policy.
249
  However, in a 
shocking case issued on August 23, 2010, a Federal District Court judge 
ruled against the Obama executive order.
250
  In Sherley v. Sebelius, the 
District Court held that federal funding for HESC research clearly violated 
the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, which prohibits research where a “human 
embryo is destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subject to risk of injury or 
                                                          
 245.  See Rob Stein, Obama’s Order on Stem Cells Leaves Key Questions to NIH, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/03/09/AR2009030903156.html. 
 246.  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama is Leaving Some Stem Cell Issues to Congress, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/09/us/politics/09stem.html. 
 247.  See Jesse Lee, “A Debt of Gratitude to So Many Tireless Advocates,” WHITE 
HOUSE BLOG (Mar. 9, 2009, 12:09 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/03/09/A-debt-
of-gratitude-to-so-many-tireless-advocates/. 
 248.  See generally Devin Dwyer, NIH Issues New Stem Cell Research Guidelines as 
Obama Administration Prepares to Appeal Court Ruling, POLITICAL PUNCH BLOG (Aug. 31, 
2010) http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/08/nih-issues-new-stem-cell-research-
guidelines-as-obama-administration-prepares-to-appeal-court-ruling/. 
 249.  Id. 
 250.  See Sherley v. Sebelius, 704 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71-72 (D.D.C. 2010) (overruling the 
National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Human Cell Research, which were promulgated 
in response to President Obama’s Executive Order, because embryonic stem cell research 
involves the destruction of an embryo in violation of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment).  
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death greater than that allowed under applicable regulations.”
251
 
On the same day of the ruling, the Obama administration decided to 
appeal because of the judgment’s potential to block federal funding of 
HESC research.
252
  On September 9, 2010, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia overturned the District Court’s ruling 
and provided temporary permission for federal funding of HESC research. 
253
  The harm caused by the District Court’s ruling “poured sand into that 
engine of discovery.”
254
  A few months later, at the request of the federal 
government, a federal appellate court reinstated the presidential policy and 
suspended the injunction issued by the district court.
255
 
The court dispute over the Dickey-Wicker Amendment flared up again 
on April 29, 2011 when the appellate court permanently overturned the 
district court’s injunction, holding that the Dickey-Wicker Amendment was 
ambiguous.
256
  The NIH applauded the ruling, with a spokesperson stating, 
“I am delighted and relieved to learn of the decision of the Court of 
Appeals.”
257
  The ruling was reconfirmed on July 27, 2011, when a federal 
judge dismissed the legal challenge to government funding of HESC 
research.
258
  Ultimately, President Obama’s policy allowing funding for 
                                                          
 251.  Id. (finding that the new NIH Guidelines allowed federal funding of HESC 
research, which involves the destruction of embryos). 
 252.  See generally Dwyer, supra note 248, 248 (criticizing that the ruling as one that 
could “cause irreparable damage and delay potential breakthroughs to improve care for 
people living with serious diseases and conditions . . . the injunction threatens to stop 
progress in one of the most encouraging areas of biomedical research”). 
 253.  See Janice Hopkins Tanne, US Court Temporarily Lifts Ban Imposed in August on 
Stem Cell Research, THE BMJ  (Sept. 10, 2010), 
http://www.bmj.com/content/341/bmj.c4981. 
 254.  Id. (stating that “[t]he ruling threw the field into disarray, immediately halting 
some projects and causing the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) to put a hold on many 
research grants”). 
 255.  See Ubaka Ogbogu, US Appeal Court Reinstates Obama’s Funding Policy on Stem 
Cell Research, STEM CELL NETWORK, (May 2, 2011), 
http://scnblog.typepad.com/scnblog/2011/05/us-appeal-court-obama-funding-policy-stem-
cell-research.html. 
 256.  See Bill Mears, Appeals Court Lifts Ban on Federal Funding For Stem-Cell 
Research, CNN, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-04-29/us/stem.cells_1_stem-cell-research-cell-
types-ban-research?_s=PM:US (last visited July 14, 2014, 10:47 AM),. 
 257.  Maggie Fox, Appeals Court Hands Obama a Stem-Cell Victory, NATIONAL 
JOURNAL (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.nationaljournal.com/healthcare/appeals-court-hands-
obama-a-stem-cell-victory-20110429. 
 258.  George Annas, Embryo research was born political, STEM CELLS: BIOLOGY, 
BIOETHICS, AND APPLICATIONS (Oct. 28, 2010),  
http://stemcellbioethics.wikischolars.columbia.edu/Legal+and+Political+History+of+Stem+
Cell+Science (reporting that the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia lifted an 
injunction imposed last year by a U.S. District judge, who said all embryonic stem cell 
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HESC research was allowed to proceed. 
From the above, it is evident that law and morality often overlap, 
especially when the government is involved.  Law shapes and provides a 
mechanism to balance various government interests including, curing 
diseases, scientific advances, and human dignity.  The regulation of HESC 
research is not a simple permission or prohibition.  In previous years, the 
complexity of this issue has been demonstrated by the federal 
government’s strategies.  Nevertheless, HESC research is worthy of 
attention from the White House and Congress.  It appears as if the U.S. 
government takes the approach of patenting first and asking questions later.  
This hands-off approach is market oriented.
259
  Opponents have strongly 
criticized this approach for its lack of ethical and social considerations.
260
  
Scientific research can be conducted with little public oversight.  In 
addition, when federal funding is limited, private funding is still allowed, 
which might lead to even less moral considerations related to HESC 
research.  Therefore, this article argues, it would be reasonable to remove 
moral review of HESC from the patent law.  Regulating  federal funding to 
HESC research is not only morally acceptable but also provides an 
important tool for monitoring HESC research.  Federal funding should be 
allowed in HESC research; rather than patent law restrictions. 
CONCLUSION 
As has been demonstrated, few can deny the intrinsic link between 
HESC and morality.
261
  This article argues that we should effectively 
control and monitor this questionable technology.  The problem is whether 
such control should be within the patent law system.  The approach adopted 
by the EU and China involves inserting moral provisions into their patent 
law to limit the patentability of inventions related to HESC, whereas the 
U.S. has not.  The U.S. government’s approach uses federal-funding 
control instead of patent control.  Reviewing these various approaches, 
                                                          
research at the National Institutes of Health amounted to destruction of embryos, in 
violation of congressional spending laws). 
 259.  See NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN STEM 
CELL RESEARCH: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY 
COMMISSION 59 (1999), available at https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/23 
(discussing the causal link between federal support for basic biotechnology research and 
firms developing marketable products). 
 260.  Michael J. Malinowsk and Nick Littlefield, Transformation of a Research Platform 
Into Commercial Products: The Impact of United States Federal Policy on Biotechnology, 
in TIMOTHY A. CAULFIELD AND BRYN WILLIAMS-JONES, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
GENETIC RESEARCH: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, at 29-53 (1999). 
 261.  See Warren-Jones, supra note 52, at 638-61. 
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morality should play the role of initially filtering what research is 
appropriate instead of regulating through the patent system.
262
  Because 
even if the results of HESC research can be patented, HESC research could 
still be performed and funded.  Therefore, immoral research should be 
prohibited at the beginning instead of at the patent-application stage.  In 
addition, although the EU and China consider morality in granting patents, 
there is no direct moral standard, moral definition or defined meaning of 
industrial or commercial use, which inevitably results in legal 
inconsistency.  It seems better to establish the specific authority to monitor 
HESC-related research pursuant to specific regulations before such 
research is conducted.  Moreover, morality clauses in patent law aim to 
reduce the adverse impact of broad patents that might develop 
insupportable drugs and therapies.  In terms of funds invested into such 
research, the reward represented by patent seems overvalued.  Therefore, 
this article concludes, a patent system without a morality clause would be a 
critical step forward for HESC research. Infusing moral exclusions into 
patent law is both inefficient and ineffective. 
 
                                                          
 262.  Id. (concluding that “it is time that the core morality provision is no longer viewed 
as a fundamental regulator of new technology—it is an initial filter and it should never 
become more than that”). 
